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Articles
Hoffnan v. Red Owl Stores:
The Rest of the Story
WILLIAM C. WHITFORD AND STEWART MACAULAY*
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores is one of the most famous twentieth-century cases in
American contract law, usually credited both with expanding the reach of the
promissory estoppel doctrine and with opening up the issue of liability for
precontractual reliance. It is a staple in contracts casebooks. By fortunate circumstance,
we have located the plaintiff, who retains a vivid memory about many of the
circumstances in his famous case. We have interviewed him and we have examined the
full trial record, as well as the briefs on appeaL In this Article we tell the story of what
we have learned about this famous case, including what happened after the appellate
decision. We conclude that a fuller understanding of the facts provides information
about a promise that was made, yet was not described in the Court's opinion. This
promise supports the outcome of the litigation. Justice was done! The plaintiff
substantially relied to his detriment after receiving specific assurances from an
authorized agent of the defendant that he would receive a franchise if he relied by
selling his bakery building and business. Reimbursing precontractual reliance in this
circumstance can be done without creating a rule that would justify reimbursement of
precontractual reliance in all circumstances.
* Professors of Law Emeritii, University of Wisconsin Law School. We are grateful for many
very helpful comments on an earlier draft from Professors Rachel Arnow-Richman, Jean Braucher,
Jay Feinman, Robert Gordon, Robert Hillman, Alan Hyde, John Kidwell, Charles Knapp, Juliet
Kostritsky, Ethan Leib, Peter Linzer, Kate O'Neill, Todd Rakoff, Amy Schmitz, Robert Scott, Brad
Snyder, and Gordon Smith. We have received valuable research assistance from Anthony Gibart, J.D.,
University of Wisconsin Law School, 2oo9, and Nicole Denow, J.D., University of Wisconsin Law
School, 2ool. Our greatest debt is to Joseph Hoffmann. Without his willingness to share his memories
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INTRODUCTION
A pair of bargainers negotiate but fail to conclude a legally
enforceable contract. Has one any rights against the other? In
conversation, Ian Macneil, the great theorist of relational contract, said
that classical contract law treats contract formation as if it were a light
switch. It is either on or off-either there is a contract and the possibility
of liability or there is not and the parties are free to walk away without
802 [Vol. 61:80i
THE REST OF THE STORY
obligations to each other.' Macneil, however, said that in many cases,
particularly where there are strong relational elements, the situation is
like a rheostat.2 It is hard to say when the light is on or off as power is fed
little by little to the light as the dial is turned. Relational bargains evolve
as the parties work toward a deal little by little. This means that one
bargainer may have influenced the other to do something to her
detriment that she would not have done but for the expectation that
there certainly would be a deal. While courts sometimes bent the rules of
formation and found that the parties had concluded a contract when one
was responsible for serious reliance by the other, there was no
recognized rule providing for recovery by the relying party when the
ultimate deal was not concluded. However, over forty years ago things
began to change in many states. And ever since then, there has been
scholarly debate about the problem.
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,4 is the most famous of the cases
that founded a new area of contract law by allowing recovery of reliance
expenses incurred before a contract had been formed. Hoffman also has
been the most influential case in framing the issue of the rights of a
relying party. It was also an influential decision giving meaning to the
then-relatively new doctrine of promissory estoppel.' Hoffman has now
become a staple of contracts casebooks, 6 and it is routinely discussed in
i. For a discussion of the history of the problem, see I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 3.26 (3d ed. 2004).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., Hill's, Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 246 P.2d o99, itor (Wash. 1952) (bending the
usual rules that allow an offer to dictate what will constitute an acceptance); Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d
1026, 1o30 (Cal. 1934) (finding acceptance by performance when it seemed an offer had been revoked
before notification of acceptance); Kearns v. Andree, 139 A. 695, 698 (Conn. 1928) (awarding restitution
for services that provided no benefit to the defendant when a contract was too indefinite to be enforced).
4. 133 N.w.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
5. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is widely viewed as having been created by the famous
section 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts, published in 1930. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTs § 90
(1930). A Restatement section does not automatically become law, but today most if not all
jurisdictions have case law adopting the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See 3 ERiC MILLs HOLMES,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.I2 (rev. ed. 1996) ("All American jurisdictions ... adopt and apply a theory
of promissory estoppel grounded in section 90 of the Contracts' Restatement."). Hoffman was the first
case to adopt the principle of promissory estoppel as the law of Wisconsin. See 133 N.W.2d at 275. As
slightly amended by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS, published in 1981, the section now reads:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Hoffman was immediately recognized as a
significant case, one that framed the problem of protecting precontractual reliance in terms of
promissory estoppel, whereas it had been framed as an issue of a duty to bargain in good faith in other
countries. See Charles Knapp, Contracts, in 1966 ANN. SURV. AM. L. '38, 138-43 (1967).
6. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 454 (7th ed. 2008);
GERALD E. BERENDT ET AL., CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE 313 (2d ed. 20o7); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C.
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law review articles and textbook discussions about recovery for
"precontractual reliance."7 Some courts in other states have adopted the
Hoffman rule while others have rejected it.8
We have had the unexpected good fortune to locate and interview
Joseph Hoffmann,9 the plaintiff in this famous case.1' We have been
BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 348 (2d ed. 2oo8) (note case); THOMAS D.
CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 223 (5th ed. 2oo8);
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTS 284 (9th ed. 2oo8); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH
ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 230 (7th ed. 2oo8); BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 78 (2d ed. 2oo8) ("A critic of the decision might challenge it as follows:
'must the law save every fool, however gullible?"'); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 576 (7th ed. 2001); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 581
(2d ed. 1992); JAMEs F. HOGG ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 269
(2oo8) (note case); FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 223 (3d ed. 1986)
(note case); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 134 (6th ed. 2007) (note case); I STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM
WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 390 (2d ed. 2003); IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL,
CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 679 (3d ed. 2001); ARTHUR RosETn & DANIEL J.
BUSSEL, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 661 (6th ed. 1999); ROBERT E. Sconr & JODY S. KRAUS,
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 287 (4th ed. 2007); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACTS
AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 96 (4th ed. 2001). It also appears in IAN
R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL COOPERATION: EAST AFRICA-TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 530 (1968).
7. E.g., STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION,
PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT § 8.3.2.2, at 343-45, (1995); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer
Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1254-
55 (1996); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the Holdup
Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1382 (2008).
8. For a good summary of the case law as of 1995, see generally Neiss v. Ehlers, 899 P.2d 700 (Or.
Ct. App. 1995). In Neiss, an Oregon Court of Appeals chose to adopt Hoffman and allow recovery. Id.;
see Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REv. 678, 691-92 (1984).
Hoffman was also innovative in its application of promissory estoppel doctrine in holding that the
court could limit damages to reliance recovery. See 133 N.W.2d at 276-77. This principle is now
incorporated in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See supra note 5. We will ignore
this part of the case in this Article, however, because there was no possibility of recovering anything
other than reliance damages in the Hoffman case. See infra note 221.
9. Mr. Hoffmann has always spelled his name with two n's, as is made clear in the trial record.
Transcript of Trial at 2, Hoffmann v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1963),
microformed on File No. 14,900-14,954 C1985/o26, Roll CC-159 POS (State Historical Soc'y of Wis.).
For unknown reasons, the Wisconsin Supreme Court used only one n, and the case name has been
spelled that way ever since. In this Article we will use the correct spelling of the name except when
referring to the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision itself.
io. At a reunion dinner of the Wisconsin Law School class of 1968, Professor Whitford happened
to be seated with Mr. Thomas Kubasta. Mr. Kubasta has made his career as a lawyer in Wautoma,
where most of the events leading up to this litigation occurred and where Joe Hoffmann then lived. In
the course of conversation, Whitford told Kubasta about the case that had made Wautoma famous in
contracts casebooks and expressed an interest in locating Hoffmann. Though Hoffmann left Wautoma
for good in December 1961, Kubasta vowed to do what he could to find somebody in town who knew
whether Hoffmann was still alive and, if so, where he lived. After considerable effort Kubasta located
the one family still living in Wautoma with whom the Hoffmanns currently exchange Christmas cards.
From this contact came an address in St. Joseph, Michigan, and later a telephone call from Whitford to
Hoffmann. Hoffmann verified that he was indeed the plaintiff in the famous case, and agreed to be
interviewed about it. All our interviews with Hoffmann have been by telephone.
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delighted to discover that Mr. Hoffmann remains in good health." And
despite the many years that have passed since the events involved in the
case, he still has a sharp recollection of many of the events leading up to
the trial and appeal. Mr. Hoffmann told us many things about the events
that provoked the litigation as well as the litigation itself. He raised
points not reflected in the decision or in the scholarly literature spawned
by the case. We have verified much of what he has told us from the full
trial record." We have also looked at the appellate briefs and Red Owl's
Annual Reports.
We have decided to tell a fuller story of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores
as we now understand it. Investigating the detailed background of
famous cases is now widely accepted as a useful form of scholarship."
Among important insights that stories about well-known cases can offer
are the following: First, they are almost certain to reveal that the "facts"
stated in an appellate opinion are carefully selected and omit events that
many would consider highly relevant to an evaluation of the proper
outcome of the litigation. These limitations on facts as stated in appellate
opinions are not just because the judge or judges writing opinions select
what they choose to report, but also because the litigation strategies of
the parties, and the evidentiary rulings of the trial judge, keep certain
events from getting into the record. Learning about these matters teach
important practical lessons about the operation of the legal system.
Second, we all like to speculate about the wisdom of a decision, and a
fuller explication of the facts can enrich such a discussion. This is
especially valuable when the story is about a foundational case like
ii. Life has been good to Mr. Hoffmann and his family. They have been successful and they are
well off. But the events leading up to the case had a significant impact on the course of their lives, so
Mr. Hoffmann's ability to remember them in great detail is not surprising. For some years Hoffmann
has been aware of the fame of his case in law schools because one of his daughters attended law school
and studied the case.
12. Under Wisconsin practice, the parties edit the transcript to produce the document that goes to
the supreme court of the state. This version of the transcript is widely available to those who have
access to the briefs presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 101-242,
Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d 267 (No. 14954). A much fuller trial record is available in microfiche through
the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. See Transcript of Record, Hoffman, No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 21, 1963), microformed on File No. 14,900-14,954 C1985/o26, Roll CC-159 POS (State Historical
Soc'y of Wis.). The certified transcript contained in this trial record is the one we have cited as
"Transcript of Trial," supra note 9. Page numbers in references to the "Transcript of Record"
hereinafter in this document correspond to fuller trial record. See infra note 18.
13. There are two books containing "stories" about contract cases that are now widely used as
supplementary materials in contracts courses. We have long used one in our teaching: RICHARD DANZIG &
GEOFFREY WATSON, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. 2004). A more recent addition
to the literature is DOUGLAS BAIRD, CONTRACTS STORIES (2007). For discussion of the advantages of
what Professor Judith Maute calls "legal archaeology,' see Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal
Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 8o TUL. L. REV. I I6i, 175-77
(2oo6); Judith L. Maute, Response, The Values of Legal Archaeology, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 223, 224-31.
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Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Although the current vitality of any
principle in the area of precontractual reliance perhaps ought to be
independent of the wisdom of a decision now forty-five years old, in fact
the current assessment of the wisdom of the outcome of the Hoffnan
case is likely to subtly influence many people's attitudes about the law."
We have an additional reason for exploring the background of
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Several years ago, Professor Robert Scott
also obtained the full trial record and wrote an article arguing that the
case was wrongly decided." We have a somewhat different perspective
on the case. We also have additional information to add to the story,
mostly gained from several interviews with Joe Hoffmann. While
Professor Scott would have a strong argument for his position if the facts
were as he assumed them to be, we believe the available information
about the events leading to the litigation suggests a story supportive of
the ultimate outcome in this litigation, though not necessarily all parts of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion. We have decided to tell the
story as we now understand it. Only the most important differences in
our story and Professor Scott's account will be noted, mostly in a few
footnotes. 6
After we have related our story in full, in the conclusion we win
return to the benefits of storytelling, and indicate what we think we have
learned from our study of the full facts of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.
These findings suggest that the case reached a just result, and one that
would be less controversial if facts not previously fully known had been
understood in the many discussions of this famous case.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
Although many readers will have studied Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores in law school, most will find it useful to have their memories
refreshed on the basic facts before we begin discussing the facts in detail.
And for those who are not deeply engaged in the debate about recovery
for precontractual reliance, it will be helpful to sketch some of the
14. Professor Robert Scott has attributed what he regards as the "delay" in understanding the law
of precontractual reliance "at least in part, to ... the unfortunate case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc." Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 Omto
Sr. L.J.71, l (2007).
i5. Id. Scott's article is also published as a chapter in BAIRD, supra note 13, at 62.
16. We had to decide whether to write the text as a debate with Professor Scott point by point or
to tell the full story in a way that could be understood by a reader not familiar with Scott's work. We
think that only a few readers would be interested in a paper focused on an article by another scholar.
We hope that our Article will be useful to anyone studying the case or concerned with precontractual
reliance.
Though in this Article we are critical of Professor Scott's earlier work on Hoffman v.. Red Owl
Stores, we have been and remain admirers of many of his numerous contributions to contracts
scholarship. He is one of the giants of our generation of contract scholars.
806 [Vol. 61:8oi
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possible contending positions. In this Part, we will try to accomplish both
objectives by providing several hypotheticals that draw on the basic facts
of Hoffman but then vary them to illustrate the continuum of situations
where courts might and might not find liability for precontractual
reliance.
Red Owl Stores ran a chain of franchised grocery stores in a
vacation area where business was much better in the summer than in the
winter. The home office made the final decision whether to make a
contract with a person who wanted to be a Red Owl franchisee.
However, corporations act through people who are and are not
authorized agents. Ed Lukowitz was a Red Owl Divisional General
Manager. Joe Hoffmann was a baker who owned his own growing
business and worked there. He wanted to improve his financial situation
by becoming a Red Owl franchisee in a central Wisconsin town. Ed and
Joe worked together to find a suitable location for such a grocery store
and to arrange Joe's finances so that the Red Owl home office would
find Joe acceptable and award him the contract. At the time when our
various scenarios begin, Red Owl and Joe have not agreed on important
terms such as in which city the store would be located, how much Joe
would invest, and whether Joe would accept Red Owl's franchise form
contract that listed many obligations of franchisees. Red Owl has a
standard form contract, and Joe is not going to be able to make many
changes in the way the corporation runs its franchise division.
Assume first that Joe takes steps to make himself a more attractive
potential franchisee without Red Owl's request or knowledge. Suppose,
for example, that he sells assets at a loss so that he has more money in
the bank that he can devote to a new franchise. Then negotiations fail,
and Joe seeks to recover for the loss on the sale. We would expect that
courts would not charge Red Owl with Joe's loss. Joe ought to have
known that he was taking the risk that the sale might not be enough to
land the franchise. There is nothing that could be considered a promise.
Reliance on the mere hope for a contract is not enough to establish
liability."
17. Professor Farnsworth looked at the American cases in detail in E. Allan Farnsworth,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 217, 221 (1987). He noted, "[A] party that enters negotiations in the hope of the gain that will
result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results in the other party breaks off the
negotiations." Seventeen years later, in the fourth edition of his textbook, he brought the material up
to date. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 190 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTs]. He stated:
In recent decades, courts have shown increasing willingness to impose pre-contractual
liability. The possible grounds can be grouped under four headings: (i) unjust enrichment
resulting from the negotiations; (2) a misrepresentation made during the negotiations; (3) a
specific promise made during the negotiations; (4) an agreement to negotiate in good faith.
Id. at 192. Farnsworth reported further that "American courts .. . have . . . declined to find a general
March2olo] 807
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Assume second that Ed says to Joe: "I can't be sure what the guys at
the home office will decide, but, based on my experience with them, I
think that they will give you the franchise if you sell the bakery now. This
way you'll be ready to set up and operate the grocery store, and you'll
have some more cash available to invest." Joe sells the bakery and receives
less than its fair market value because of the pressure to conclude a
transaction immediately. Nonetheless, the people at the home office refuse
to grant Joe a franchise. As we have stated the situation, it is very unlikely
that Red Owl would be liable. Ed stated an opinion, but Joe knew that Ed
could not award the franchise. A trier of fact would likely read Ed's
statement as equivalent to "I don't know if it will be enough, but, based on
my experience, you have no chance unless you sell the bakery now."
Now change the case somewhat: After Joe has told Red Owl how
much he can invest, and with the knowledge and seeming approval of
Red Owl officers has acquired an option on a lot in a central Wisconsin
town that would be appropriate for a supermarket, Ed tells Joe that he
has received a message from the home office. Ed says that those who
make decisions there have said that if Joe sells his bakery immediately,
Red Owl will award him the franchise. Joe sells the bakery immediately
at a substantial loss. However, Red Owl refuses to award the franchise
because the corporation's business changed, and its officials do not want
to take new risks. Assume a court would decide that Ed had apparent
authority as an agent to pass along messages from the home office to Joe
in the field. Ed's statement could be construed as a promise made on
behalf of Red Owl. If a court recognizes precontractual liability, we have
a strong case for liability.
We can continue to add facts that might change the result. Suppose
that Red Owl informed Joe that he had to have a certain amount of cash
to invest in the business in order to set up a store. Joe represented that
he had the required amount of cash, and Ed represented that Red Owl
had agreed to grant the franchise if Joe would sell the bakery. Joe sells
the bakery at a loss. When Red Owl's home office officials discovered
that Joe did not have the required amount of cash, they ended
negotiations with Joe. If a trier of fact found this to be the case, it seems
unlikely that Joe could recover for his loss in selling the bakery. Joe has
not satisfied a clearly implied condition of Red Owl's promise. Joe was
responsible, under this scenario, for misleading Red Owl, and it would
seem hard to argue that a court should award damages to avoid injustice.
obligation that would preclude a party from breaking off negotiations, even when success was in
prospect." Id. at 198. As we have posed the hypothetical situations in the text, none of the four groups
identified by Farnsworth are present.
808 [Vol. 61:80i
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II. WHAT HAPPENED IN HOFFMAN V. RED OWL STORES' 8
Joseph Hoffmann, born in 1932, was raised on a farm, and moved to
Appleton, Wisconsin, while attending high school. He learned the baking
trade while working in a bakery during high school and in the early years
thereafter. By 1956, already married and with children, he was ready to
acquire his own business. He located a small bakery business for sale in
Wautoma, which is located in central Wisconsin about sixty miles
southwest of Appleton. In the late 1950s, Wautoma had a population of
about 15oo." Wautoma is located near many lakes, which are sites for
second homes of residents of larger cities and several resorts.
Consequently, Wautoma's population increased by about 5000 persons in
the summer, making the summer the most profitable time for retailers.
Hoffmann worked particularly hard just before each summer weekend to
get ready for the summer weekend rush which was such an important
part of retail sales in Wautoma.2 The bakery business was successful. By
1959, Joe and his wife were able to purchase the building in which the
business was operated."
18. Our sources for the facts presented in this Part are primarily the trial record, see supra note
12, and our telephone interviews with Joe Hoffmann, conducted on October 14, 2oo8; February 1o,
2009; and March 25, 2009. We have relied on the trial record wherever possible since that testimony
was subject to cross-examination and given closer in time to the actual events. We will cite to our
Hoffmann interview notes when we report information obtained solely from these interviews. Copies
of our interview notes can be obtained by writing Professor Whitford. We have located Ed Lukowitz,
who is alive and living in Green Bay, but he has not been willing to provide us his recollections. We
would have liked to interview both him and the other Red Owl officials involved in the case. We tried
to trace the latter without success, and it is likely some or all of them are deceased. We know that the
lawyers involved in the litigation are all dead. We do have three letters from Gerry Van Hoof, Mr.
Hoffmann's lawyer, written not long after the case was decided, and we will cite from them when
appropriate.
The trial record does not contain the pretrial depositions except to the extent that parts of them
were read into the record at trial, and it does not contain the lawyers' closing arguments to the jury.
The record contains mostly exhibits, which we will cite by number, and the trial transcript, which we
will cite by the transcript page number typed by the court reporter. Scott, when citing to the transcript,
cited a handwritten number which is the "record" page. Because not all pages of the record contain
this handwritten number, and because the handwritten number is sometimes hard to decipher, we
choose to cite to the transcript page. An inevitable consequence is that both Scott and we may at times
be citing to the same dialogue from the transcript, but different page numbers will appear in the
citations.
A transcript of a trial usually reports differences in the accounts of the witnesses about events.
The jury found for Mr. Hoffmann, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed this decision on the
question of liability. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (1965). As a result, we
will report the version most supportive of his case that Red Owl Stores should be held liable.
However, where there was important evidence presented countering this version of key events, we will
report these differences in footnotes as well.
19. The 1960 population was 1466. I U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF
POPULATION: 1960, at 5 1-20 (1961) [hereinafter 1960 CENSUs], available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/
decennial/documents/o3994195vip5rch2.pdf.
20. It has been reported that Professor Grant Gilmore mentioned to several contracts scholars
that Hoffmann was allergic to bread (and implied that was why Hoffmann wanted to get out of the
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In the autumn of 1960, Hoffmann began talking with Ed Lukowitz,
the new Divisional Manager of Red Owl Stores for a territory including
upper Michigan and most of Wisconsin. Lukowitz encouraged Hoffmann
to pursue his interest in becoming a franchisee.
A. PURCHASE AND SALE OF THE WAUTOMA GROCERY
In late 1960 Hoffmann learned that a local grocery store was for
sale. Hoffmann suggested to Lukowitz that Hoffmann purchase the
grocery store and operate it to get experience as a grocer." Lukowitz was
supportive. With Lukowitz's help, Hoffmann put together a successful
offer, obtained mortgage financing, and in January 1961 began operating
"Joe the Baker's Red Owl."2 He purchased much of his inventory from
Red Owl.24 Joe hired an employee to manage the grocery store because
Joe continued to run the bakery during this period.
Over the spring of 196', Lukowitz and staff evaluated the fortunes
of the grocery store and expressed satisfaction.2 Discussions also
continued about opening a Red Owl franchise." Lukowitz informed
Hoffmann that Red Owl felt Wautoma was too small, and mentioned
several other towns in east central Wisconsin where Red Owl was
considering starting a store.' Hoffmann expressed a willingness to move
but emphasized that he had only $18,ooo to invest and wondered if that
would be enough.29 Without any inquiry into the source of the $18,ooo,3o
Lukowitz assured Hoffmann it would be enough.3'
bakery business). See Scott, supra note 14, at 98. If believed, this may lead some scholars to believe
that any misrepresentations or breached promises made to Hoffmann were not material because he
was going to get out of the bakery business in any event. In fact, Hoffmann was allergic to dust, not
bread. Flour is an allergen for Hoffmann, but he was able successfully to accommodate his allergy by
wearing a mask and gloves when working with flour. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann
(Oct. 14, 2oo8).
21. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 3-4.
22. Id. at 8. It was never Hoffmann's plan that this store would be the ultimate Red Owl
franchise. It was too small and lacked off-street parking. Hoffmann had a different site in Wautoma in
mind for a Red Owl store if Wautoma had been regarded as an appropriate franchise location by Red
Owl. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 20.
23. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 9; Charlie Luhm Sells His Grocery to Joe Hoffnann,
WAUSHARA ARGUS, Feb. 2, 1961, at i.
24. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 9.
25. Id. at 8-9, 17.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 21.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Hoffmann was asked on cross-examination about discussions at this time: "Was there any discussion
at any time as to how this $i8,ooo was to be made up? That is, was it all unencumbered cash or partly to
be borrowed cash?" Id. at 91. Hoffmann answered: "I don't believe there was any discussion of that."~ Id.
In discussions of the Hoffman case, some have suggested that Red Owl understood Hoffrnann's
statement to represent the ability to invest $1i8,ooo in unencumbered cash. See infra note 240. It is clear
that this was not Hoffmann's intention, we will later discuss, why we think that it is unlikely that Red
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By the end of May, Lukowitz urged the sale of the Wautoma
grocery, because he wanted Hoffmann free to devote more time and
energy to getting a Red Owl store established elsewhere, At the time,
Lukowitz anticipated he could have Hoffmann operating a Red Owl
store by November i961 Further, Hoffmann had a ready buyer, his
manager Hoffmann expressed reluctance to sell the store at the
beginning of the lucrative summer season, but he relented on Lukowitz's
further urgings and reassurance that the $i8,ooo would be sufficient to
put him into "a bigger operation.' On June 6, 96 the Wautoma
grocery store was sold to the manager, Ed Wrysinski, for about what
Hoffmann had invested in it ($18,000).
FIGURE I.: JOE HOFFMANN SELLs WAUTOMA GROCERY
B. PURCHASE OF THE OPTION ON THE CHILTON LOT
Over the summer of iq6i Hoffmann spent a good deal of time with
Lukowitz driving around east central Wisconsin looking for potential
Owl relied upon any such understanding. See itfra note 240 and accompanying text,
STranscript of Trial, supra note 9, at i8-. n
32. Id at 19-20,
33, Idi at 2
34, See id at 18.
35,See id.at 18-20,
,6 See id at 20; see also infra p.8 11fig.
37, Ed Wrysinski Buys Red Owl fronm lJ IInoe1b Hofan, WAUSHARA Ax cUS, June 15, i6, at
Reprinted with permission from the Waushara Arts
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sites for his Red Owl store.'8 Hoffmann understood that the amount of a
franchisee's required investment was related to the size of the
prospective store, so he tended to focus on the smallest cities that Red
Owl considered acceptable. 9 He settled on Chilton.' It is about eighty
miles due east of Wautoma, and in 1960 it had a population of about
25oo.4' Hoffmann and Lukowitz identified an undeveloped lot in Chilton
that they thought was well situated for a new supermarket." With
Lukowitz's encouragement, on August i, 1961, Hoffmann obtained a
thirty-day option to purchase the lot.43 It was obtained without paying
any option price. It required a payment of $iooo upon exercise of the
option and an additional $5ooo at closing (a total of $6ooo) for the lot."
As the day the option was scheduled to expire approached (August
31st), Hoffmann telephoned Lukowitz and asked whether he should
exercise it.45 Hoffmann clearly understood at this time that Red Owl
Stores had not yet committed to approving a franchise in Chilton or one
on this lot.46 Lukowitz advised Hoffmann to get a fifteen-day extension
on the option, which Hoffmann was able to do.47 According to
Hoffmann's testimony at trial, on September 13th, he called Lukowitz
again." He asked for advice on exercising the option. Hoffmann was
reluctant to spend the money unless Red Owl found this location
acceptable. Lukowitz told Hoffmann to wait a day. 0 Lukowitz was going
to travel on the next day to corporate headquarters in Hopkins,
Minnesota (a Minneapolis suburb)." Late on September 14th, Lukowitz's
secretary called Hoffmann and relayed the message that Hoffmann
should exercise the option. 2 Hoffmann told the secretary that he wanted
to talk to Lukowitz because he was unwilling to spend the money based
on her word.53 On the morning of September 15th, Hoffmann telephoned
Lukowitz in his Green Bay office. Lukowitz said: "Everything is all set.
38. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 21.
39. For example, Hoffmann ruled out Ripon, which had a 1960 census population of 6163. See id.
at 120; 1960 CENSUS, supra note 19, at 51-16.
40. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 23.
41. The 1960 census population was 2578. See 1960 CENSUS, supra note 19, at 51-14. Chilton is
located in an agricultural area and does not have a substantially larger summer population.
42. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 22-23.
43. See id. at 23-24, 26-27.
44. See id. at 26.
45. See id. at 28.
46. See id. at 27-28.
47. See id. at 28.




52. See id. at 30.
53. See id.
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Go ahead and pick up your option."" That afternoon, Hoffmann paid the
landowner $iooo and exercised the option."
A few days before exercise of the option, on September II, 1961,
Lukowitz prepared the first financial statement about Hoffmann's net
worth, based on answers to questions he asked Hoffmann. The
statement showed $io,ooo cash in the bank, $6ooo equity in the
Hoffmanns' personal residence, $15oo in inventory at the bakery
(presumably mostly supplies), equity in the bakery building of $4500
($12,000 market value less a $7500 mortgage), and equity in bakery
equipment of $12,000 ($19,500 less a $7500 chattel mortgage). This
represented a total net worth of $34,000, though in subsequent
negotiations between Hoffmann and Red Owl it never was contemplated
that Hoffmann would invest his home equity in a Red Owl franchise.
Lukowitz testified that he presented this financial statement to higher
Red Owl officials.' 8 However, it is not clear whether Lukowitz did this
before he advised Hoffmann to exercise the option on September 15th.
C. THE CHILTON MEETING AND FIRST PROPOSED FINANCING PLAN
On September 27th, Hoffmann met Lukowitz at the lot in Chilton.59
Two Red Owl officials from corporate headquarters, Pete Reymund, a
field representative working on new stores, and Harold Carlson, the
future development manager, were with Lukowitz." Reymund and
Carlson expressed approval of the lot and its location. Then, while the
four were sitting in the car, Reymund created another financial statement
based on Hoffmann's answers to Reymund's questions.6 1 The financial
statement provided was similar to the earlier one, except it showed that
Hoffmann had only $2500 in cash on hand and that the bakery building
was unencumbered.' The difference reflected the fact that shortly after
54. See id. Lukowitz provided a different account of these events: He testified that he had heard
nothing from headquarters and told Hoffmann that he could give Hoffmann no particular advice with
respect to exercise of the option. Id. at 188. He advised Hoffmann to use his own judgment. Id. He
testified that Hoffmann had expressed concern that A & P would purchase the lot if Hoffmann
allowed the option to expire, so that the lot could not be obtained again later. Id. at 187-89.
Lukowitz's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Harold Carlson, a Red Owl official from
headquarters, who said that he asked Hoffmann at a September 27th meeting why he had put down
money on the lot when there was not yet a deal, and that Hoffmann replied that he was concerned that
A & P would buy the lot if he did not exercise the option. Id. at 309.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 191.
57. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 40.
58. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 192.
59. See id. at 291.
6o. See id.
6i. See id. at 292-93-
62. See Transcript of Record, supra note I2, Ex. 39.
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the earlier financial statement (given on September i ith), Hoffmann had
withdrawn cash and paid off the mortgage on the bakery building.
After taking down Hoffmann's financial situation, Reymund and
Carlson drafted the first of what would become several "proposed
financial plans" for Hoffmann's franchise.64 This plan contemplated an
"equity" contribution at $I8,6oo, consisting of $12,000 from the sale of
the bakery building, $36oo in cash,65 and $3000 on "resale of the lot."6
Listed as "other trade payables" was a $7500 loan from Hoffmann's
father-in-law. Listed separately as "Bakery" was $15oo in bakery
inventory and $12,ooo equity in the bakery equipment? Hoffmann's
total investment, including the father-in-law's loan, was $39,600.69 This
first financial plan, in tabular form, was as follows:
63. Hoffmann testified to this fact. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 152-54, 168-69. This
point is critical to one of the important differences between our account and Professor Scott's. Scott
acknowledges Hoffmann's payment of the outstanding mortgage on the bakery building in mid-
September. See Scott, supra note 14, at 78, 79 n.39 ("Hoffman paid off the $7500 mortgage on the
bakery building, reducing his cash on hand in the bank to $2500."). However, later in his article he
overlooks this payment and states that in the September 27th statement Hoffmann misrepresented the
bakery building as clear of liens, causing Red Owl to be misled as to the resources available to
Hoffmann for investment in a franchise. See id. at 81 ("The problem [Red Owl had], in essence, was
that ... contrary to Hoffman's initial representations, the [bakery] building had been mortgaged.
When it became clear that the building was not unencumbered and thus could not provide a major
portion of Hoffman's equity contribution, the financing plan had to be revised." (footnote omitted)).
In the middle of October, after the September 27th financial statement that Scott describes as
misleading, Hoffmann remortgaged the bakery building for $75oo. See Transcript of Trial, supra note
9, at 151-52. He did this because he thought that this is what Lukowitz wanted. Hoffmann, still thinking
that a Chilton store would be opened soon, was "getting his money together." See infra note x is.
In concluding that Hoffmann had misled officials about his assets in the September 27th meeting,
Scott was apparently misled by Red Owl's cross-examination of Hoffmann. David Fulton, Red Owl's
lawyer, suggested to Hoffmann that the bakery building had been encumbered at the time of the
September 27th financial statement, yet was wrongly listed on that statement as unencumbered.
Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 104-05. Hoffmann did not correct Fulton and appeared to agree
with him. On redirect, however, Hoffmann's lawyer had Hoffmann correct this misstatement. He
testified that he had paid off the mortgage on the bakery building, as stated in the text. The building
then remained unencumbered for a few weeks that included the September 27th financial statement.
Id. at 150-55. Hoffmann testified that he had checked with the bank the morning of his redirect "to
make sure." See id. at 169. Apparently, Hoffmann had himself been unclear about this important fact
at the time of his cross-examination. The trial took place nearly two years after the events happened.
64. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 39.
65. It is not explained in the transcript why $36oo in cash was expected, when the financial
statement prepared at the same time listed $2500 in the bank.
66. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 39; see Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 293.
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TABLE i: FIRST FINANCIAL PLAN




Resale of lot $3000*
Loan from father-in-law $7500
Inventory in bakery $1500
Bakery equipment (and encumbrance) $19,500 ($7500)
Total (using net value for bakery equipment) $39,6oo
It needs to be emphasized that this first proposed financial plan was
drafted as four people sat in a car in Chilton. All of them, including
Hoffmann, understood that Reymund and Carlson, the Red Owl officials
from corporate headquarters, needed to take the proposed plan back to
headquarters for further vetting.70 Nonetheless, Reymund and Carlson
were headquarters officials who worked full time on development of new
stores and likely knew of any specific requirements for all new franchises.
They were encouraging at this meeting, and Hoffmann was encouraged.
He testified: "[Carlson and Reymund] felt this whole thing looked real
good.... [T]hey assured me that day there appeared to be no
hitch. . . and that we should be getting our building started and under
way in the not too distant future." 7'
Several features of this proposed plan are worth noting for what
they show about the thinking at the time and what they portended for
the future. First, the plan contemplated the sale of the bakery building
and investment of the cash proceeds into the Chilton store. As
Lukowitz knew, it had been Hoffmann's plan that he would keep the
bakery building and rent it to an employee, who would operate the
bakery after Hoffmann left Wautoma.73 This would provide Hoffmann
with some income to support his family while building up the Chilton
business. Sale of the building also meant that Hoffmann would
personally invest more than the $i8,ooo he originally contemplated into
the franchise. 74
70. Reymund so testified. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 295.
71. Id. at 33.
72. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 39.
73. See id.; Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 57, 104, 171.
74. Hoffmann repeatedly testified that he originally contemplated an investment of
"approximately" $i8,ooo in cash, that Red Owl's representatives, particularly Lukowitz, knew that,
and that they knew that some of that would come from a loan from his father-in-law. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at io, 9r-93. Hoffmann also made clear, as reported in the text
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Second, Hoffmann owned extra bakery equipment not needed for
operation of the Wautoma bakery, and it had long been his plan to install
it at the Chilton store." At this time, Red Owl did not consider
Hoffmann's bakery equipment to be part of his equity contribution,
although it would be so considered in later financing plans.6 Perhaps the
Red Owl officials present in Chilton were thinking that their superiors
would require that Hoffmann's store be justified financially on its own
and separately from consideration of any investment in or potential
revenues from the in-store bakery. However, there is nothing in the
transcript to indicate what Red Owl's thinking was on this point.
Third, Red Owl did not consider the $7500 loan from Hoffmann's
father-in-law as part of Hoffmann's "equity" contribution.? It became
clear in later negotiations that Red Owl wanted Hoffmann to have this
cash available. However, Red Owl did not consider this amount to be
part of Hoffmann's "equity" contribution, apparently because it was
borrowed.
Fourth, the plan contemplated that the Chilton lot would be resold
for a $3000 profit." The idea was that Hoffmann would transfer the lot to
a building contractor who would construct and own the building.
Hoffmann would then pay the building contractor a "rent."7  The rent
would be based on the contractor's investment and designed to provide
him with an appropriate return." Consequently, by increasing the sale
price of the lot to the builder, Hoffmann would in effect be taking out a
loan from the contractor, to be repaid in increased rent. Yet in this
financial plan, though not in later plans, profit on the sale of the lot was
treated as part of Hoffmann's "equity" contribution.
D. SALE OF THE BAKERY
Sometime during the first week of October, Lukowitz telephoned
Hoffmann from his office in Green Bay.8 ' According to Hoffmann's trial
testimony, Lukowitz told him "that Minneapolis had told [Lukowitz] that
the only hitch in this thing at the present time was that I had to get rid of
above, that he did not contemplate sale of the bakery building. Presumably Hoffmann intended that
the $18,ooo would come from his cash savings, reported as $io,ooo in his first financial statement, see
supra note 57 and accompanying text, and the $7500 loan from his father-in-law mentioned in the first
financial plan, see supra p. 815 tbl.i.
75. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 58.
76. See id. at 298.
77. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 39.
78. See id.
79. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 63.
8o. See id. The monthly rent would be based on one percent of the building cost, but an
annualized six percent return on the land cost. Id. At the end of ten years, Hoffmann was to have an
option to renew the lease or buy the building and land. Id
8x. Id. at 57.
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my bakery and my bakery building." 8z As Lukowitz knew, this had not
been Hoffmann's intention.8 Hoffmann expressed a willingness to sell
the bakery, nonetheless, if he was assured that the deal was going
through.t' He pointed out that the bakery provided his family's
livelihood, and by this time Hoffmann had six children." Lukowitz
provided verbal reassurance, insisting that sale of the bakery was the
only "hitch."" A few days earlier, Lukowitz had shown Hoffmann a
proposed floor plan for the Chilton store, which reinforced the idea that
Red Owl was proceeding with the deal.8
Hoffmann and his wife decided to sell the bakery business
immediately, including the bakery equipment not set aside for the
Chilton store, to a twenty-one-year-old bakery employee, Mike Grimm."
The sale was entirely on credit, with Grimm agreeing to make monthly
payments from business income.9 The bakery building was sold for
$io,ooo in cash to a local investor, who then rented it to Grimm.'
Hoffmann had to guarantee payment of the rent in order to get the
investor to buy the building." The building sold for $2000 less than
Hoffmann had previously valued it,92 but Hoffmann accepted the deal
anyway because of Red Owl's insistence on a quick sale and his
expectation that he would soon be set up in the Chilton store.
82. Id. Shirley Hoffmann corroborated the essence of this critical conversation in her testimony.
See id. at 261. Lukowitz was never asked about this telephone conversation by either lawyer at trial.
During this period Shirley was regularly listening into Hoffmann's long-distance calls, as Hoffmann
was often overtired, especially on Thursdays through Saturdays when he worked so hard preparing for
weekend sales. See id. at 258. Shirley testified that Joe and Lukowitz talked two to three times per
week. Id. at 263.
83. There had been some interchange between Lukowitz and Red Owl management on this issue
prior to Lukowitz's telephone call to Hoffmann. A teletype dated October 9th from Lukowitz to Mr.
Hall, a Red Owl officer, stated: "Joe Hoffman of Wautoma has cash with no strings attached. He is
going to rent his building to another baker for $200 per month." Transcript of Record, supra note 12,
Ex. so (emphasis added); see Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 211. Evidently, Red Owl
management was unwilling to go along with this plan.
84. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 58-59.
85. See id. at 87.
86. See id. at 57.
87. See id. 197-98.
88. See id. at 58-59; see also infra p. 818 fig.2.
89. Grimm's obligation was secured by a chattel mortgage payable to Tasty Bakery, a corporation
wholly owned by Joe and Shirley Hoffmann. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 8.
90. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 59.
95. Technically, the investor leased the building to Hoffmann, who then sublet it to Grimm. See
id. at 59-2.
92. This valuation was based on an appraisal that Hoffmann had obtained in the spring of 196r.
See id. at 14o.
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FIGURE 2: JOE HOFFMANN SELLS WAUTOMA BAKERY
E. LUKOWITZS WARNING OF TRotUBLE AHEAD
Joe Hoffmann told us that he still remembers clearly a surprise visit
by Ed Lukowitz to Wautoma shortly before the closing of the sale of the
bakery on November 6th " Hoffmann and Lukowitz sat in Lukowitz s car
while Hoffmann read over a memorandum that Lukowitz had received
from Red Owl headquarters." Hoffmann remembers the memorandum
stating or implying that because of financial difficulties at Red Owl, it
would be necessary to restrict the compans s investment un:new
franchises. 6 The memorandum said nothing specifically about the
Chilton store, and Lukowitz told Hoffmann that he hoped that it did not
mean trouble for Hoffmannl" However, Lukowitz had taken the time to
drive unexpectedly from Green Bay to Wautoma to show the ter egram to
Hoffmann. We can infer that Lukowitz feared that the po icy change
might derail Joe's proposed Chilton franchise,
Nothing was said at trial about this conversation. Hoffmi tann
remembers that his lawyers, in pretrial discovery, tried to et a copy of
the memorandum that Lukowitz showed Hofftnann, but Red Owl said
93, New Owner at Wautoma Baker0yW5A WusNARA ARGs, Nov ,9,196at 1 Repinted with
per6missioni from the Wisauhar a Agus
94, Telephone Interview with Josep iHoffmann, supra note2
95 See id
96 Id
97, Id,; Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann (Feb,t,'20)
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that they could not find it.98 There is no mention in the transcript of this
unsuccessful discovery request.99 Nonetheless, Hoffmann's current
recollection of his conversation with Lukowitz is very clear, including a
vision of where on Main Street in Wautoma that the car was parked.'"
We have come away from our conversations with Hoffmann convinced
that the meeting with Lukowitz actually happened.'
Notwithstanding any fear that the memorandum provoked, there
was apparently no thought of backing out of the sale of the bakery or the
bakery building. Hoffmann told us that he felt legally committed by the
contracts he had signed.0 2 And both Hoffmann and Lukowitz obviously
thought there was still at least a good chance that a franchise would be
awarded. Hoffmann rented a residence in Chilton and paid the rent for
January, with the intention of moving his family there once they had
disposed of their residence in Wautoma.'" Lukowitz wrote a letter to
Carlson, advocating Chilton as the location for Hoffmann's franchise.0 4
Lukowitz was also in contact with a builder who would construct the
building in Chilton, informing him that no final decision had yet been
made respecting a Chilton store.o' These actions indicate that Lukowitz
knew that his superiors at Red Owl had not made a final commitment to
the Chilton site, but the actions were also not inconsistent with an
understanding by Lukowitz that a commitment had been made to
Hoffmann to put him into a franchise somewhere.
98. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
99. However, there was extensive discussion at trial about Red Owl's inability to produce a later
telegram from headquarters to Lukowitz, raising the possibility that in his current recollection
Hoffmann has confused this later telegram for the earlier memorandum discussed in the text above.
We have discounted that possibility because of our interviews with Hoffmann, as described above. The
later missing telegram is discussed infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
roo. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
1o. Hoffmann does not recall why there was no mention of the missing memorandum at trial. At
one point, Hoffmann's lawyer (Van Hoof) asked Lukowitz: "Isn't it true that the amount of money
that the Red Owl stores felt was needed for working capital was continuously increased because of
experience with other stores?" Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 227. An objection to the question
was sustained, and Lukowitz never answered the question. Id. This is the only point in the transcript in
which there is reference to a policy change at Red Owl that might have adversely affected Hoffmann's
chances of obtaining a franchise.
102. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann (Mar. 25, 2009).
103. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 62-63.
104. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 12 (letter from Lukowitz to Carlson, dated
November 9, 1961). The letter related a conversation with Joe Hoffmann about the relative merits of
Chilton and another small Wisconsin town (Kewaunee) as a site for Hoffmann's store. Id. This passage
of the letter could be read as consistent with an understanding by Lukowitz that there was a
commitment to put Hoffmann in a store somewhere, but that sentiment was not stated expressly. See
id. The letter could also be read as showing Lukowitz's understanding that Red Owl officials had not
yet made a binding commitment to Hoffmann.
ro5. See id. Ex. '3 (letter from Lukowitz to Keshenberg, dated November 21, 1961). In mid-
October Hoffmann had accompanied Lukowitz to meet this builder, who had worked with Red Owl
before. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 207 (testimony of Lukowitz).
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Shortly after the sale of the bakery, Joe Hoffmann moved to
Appleton and began to work as an employee at Elm Tree Bakery." He
needed to support his family, and he had lost the income from the
Wautoma bakery. The family stayed in Wautoma in order to sell or rent
the family residence. Just before Christmas, the family moved to a rented
residence close to Appleton." They never did move to the residence that
had been rented in Chilton.0o
F. THE NOVEMBER TWENTY-SECOND MEETING IN MINNEAPOLIS AND
PROPOSED FINANCIAL PLAN
In late November, Lukowitz called Hoffmann and said, "Joe, let's go
to Minneapolis together and get this thing all ironed out; and we can get
this store in operation right after the first of the year."" They flew
together from Green Bay, and on November 22nd met at Red Owl
headquarters with Harold Carlson, who had also been at the September
meeting in Chilton, and with Walter Hall, Red Owl's credit manager." 0 Joe
Hoffmann told us that it was at this time that he first thought that Red Owl
was not likely to approve the Chilton store."' Although negotiations
continued for another two months, Hoffmann remembers that he was
upset that Red Owl was demanding more money, and that he told the
Minneapolis officials that he was thinking of consulting an attorney."2
At trial Hoffmann did not express precisely these sentiments. He
did indicate that the meeting did not go the way he expected, by
testifying: "This is the first time that I find out that they are pressing for
more money. I have already got everything sold so now they are upping
the amount of money they want."" 3 The Red Owl officials nonetheless
proceeded to the drafting of a proposed financing plan that came to be
known as the $24,100 plan, the dollar figure referring to the amount of
cash that Hoffmann needed to provide."4 This amount consisted of $46oo
in cash,"' $8ooo to be obtained from a loan from a Chilton bank secured
lo6. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 62-63.
107. See id
io8. See id
1o9. See id at 63.
no. See id. at 64. Frank Walker, the manager of the Franchise Department, made a brief
appearance but did not participate in the substantive discussions at this meeting. See id.
i ii. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
i 12. Id.
113. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 64. On Red Owl's objection, the court ordered the second
sentence of the quote stricken from the record. Id. at 65.
114. See id. at 65.
115. Hoffmann's cash position at this time reflected a series of transactions he had engaged in
since mid-October. On October I I, 1961, Hoffmann had borrowed $13,500 from the local Wautoma
bank, secured by an additional $6ooo chattel mortgage on his bakery equipment and a renewed $75oo
mortgage on the bakery building, because Lukowitz had instructed him to "get his money together."
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by the bakery equipment, $7500 in a loan from Hoffmann's father-in-law,
and $4000 "profit" from sale of the lot."' The plan also contemplated
Hoffmann's contribution of his bakery equipment."' As illustrated by the
following table, when compared with the September 27th plan, the
November 22nd plan actually represented a reduction in the money to be
invested by Hoffmann, in part because the sale of the bakery building
was for less than what previously had been considered its value."8
TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF FIRST AND SECOND FINANCIAL PLANS
(* DENOTES AMOUNTS LISTED AS EQUITY CONTRIBUTION) II9
Contribution Sept. 27th Plan Nov. 22nd Plan
Cash $36oo* $46oo*
Proceeds of Bakery Building $12,ooo* -
Resale of Lot $3ooo* $4000
Loan from Father-in-Law $7500 $750
Loan from Chilton Bank -$8ooo
Inventory in Bakery $1500 -
Bakery Equipment Value (and encumbrance) $19,500 ($7500) $17,5oo* ($8000)
Total (using net value for bakery equipment) $39,6oo $33,6oo
See id. at 154-55, 169-70; see also Scott, supra note 14, at 79 n.44. As a consequence, when he sold the
bakery building, he needed to use $7500 of the proceeds to repay the bank. Before the $13,500 bank
loan, Hoffmann had $2500 in cash resources. With the extra $25oo netted from the sale of the bakery
building, he now had over $18,ooo in cash. However, the bakery equipment was now encumbered by a
chattel mortgage of $13,500 ($7500 originally, plus an additional $6ooo when he took out the October
loan). See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 42. When Hoffmann left Wautoma in early
November, he apparently paid off the loan secured by chattel mortgage, since the second financial
plan, drafted a few weeks later, indicated that Hoffmann then possessed only $46oo in cash. See infra
p. 821 tbl.2. The assumption that he used cash to pay off the Wautoma bank loan also explains why the
Chilton bank was willing to loan $8ooo secured by the bakery equipment (reflected in the second
financial plan), something they presumably would not have done if the Wautoma bank still possessed a
chattel mortgage in the bakery equipment.
1i6. This "profit" was effectively a loan from the builder. See supra note 8o and accompanying
text. The amount of this loan had been increased by $iooo between the September and November
plans, and it was to be increased further in subsequent plans. See infra p. 825 tbl.3.
117. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 32. The bakery equipment was now valued at
$17,500, rather than the September valuation of $19,500. Throughout the record there is no indication
of how valuations were obtained for the bakery equipment, nor is there any detailing of how much
bakery equipment would be transferred to the Chilton store. Hoffmann always intended to include
some of his bakery equipment in the sale of his Wautoma business to his employee. See Telephone
Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
118. Other reasons for the difference in the total investment required by the plans are the reduced
value of the bakery equipment and noninclusion, for unexplained reasons, of bakery inventory in the
second plan. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 32.
i19. The bakery equipment (at $17,500) was now also listed as part of Hoffmann's equity
contribution to the franchise, as well as $4600 in cash. Id. Since Hoffmann effectively used
accumulated cash and part of the proceeds from the sale of the bakery building to pay off an
encumbrance on the bakery equipment for preexisting debt, see supra note II5, it was certainly
appropriate to consider at least part of the bakery equipment as "equity."
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Hoffmann testified that he had agreed to go along with this plan. 20
The record from the trial makes clear, however, that the parties
understood that the November plan was not a final plan. Two days after
the meeting, Carlson sent a copy of the November plan directly to
Hoffmann, along with a note suggesting that more funds might be
needed and concluding: "We certainly plan on being as helpful as we can
to bring the deal together if it is at all possible."' 2 In a pretrial deposition
that was read into the record at trial, Lukowitz stated about the
Minneapolis meeting: "[Hoffmann] was told right then and there that it
would not go through because of the financial situation, for his own
protection; it would be better for him to get more money, and if he could
raise it he should try to see if he could." 22
Lukowitz nonetheless remained optimistic that Hoffmann would
receive a franchise. He also remained a strong supporter of Hoffmann
within the Red Owl world. Upon returning from Minneapolis he set
about finding used fixtures that Hoffmann could buy and install in the
Chilton store. 3 Lukowitz was successful in this endeavor. On December
6, 1961, he sent a telegram to Carlson which stated that he thought he
could get the fixtures for less than $20,ooo.124 In the same telegram,
Lukowitz advocated further for Hoffmann, repeating the amount of cash
that Hoffmann could invest as detailed in the November 22nd plan and
stating: "$24,100 seems to me . . . should be enough money for anybody
12o. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 107. Hoffmann testified that he regarded the plan as
requiring more money than the September plan, presumably because in September and early October
he did not expect to sell his bakery building, despite what the September plan had said. Id. The
September plan called for $26,1oo in cash investment, assuming that proceeds from the sale of the
bakery building would be invested. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 39. So in terms of
cash, the November plan, calling for only a $24,oo cash investment, represented a reduction,
reflecting the sale of the bakery building for less than its appraised value. See id. Ex. 32.
121. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 310-12. The letter was read into the transcript but not
submitted as an exhibit. This is the only time, so far as we can tell, that Carlson or anybody else from
Minneapolis communicated directly with Hoffmann, other than at the three meetings Hoffmann had
with Minneapolis officials. At all other times, the headquarters officials communicated with Lukowitz,
asking him to tell Hoffmann anything that needed to be said.
Hall, the other Red Owl headquarters official at the November meeting, testified that they had
encouraged Hoffmann to come up with some additional money and asked whether the father-in-law
might contribute more. Id. at 320-21.
122. Id. at 206.
123. See id. Fixtures included shelving, freezer cases, and the like. This was important because Red
Owl's standard finance plan contemplated that Red Owl would finance eighty percent of the fixture
cost for a new store with a five-year loan. Reducing the cost of the fixtures would reduce Red Owl's
investment in a new franchise in Chilton, as well as the size of the periodic payments (on the fixtures
loan) that Hoffmann would have to make once a franchise opened. The idea of used fixtures was
obviously discussed during the Minneapolis meeting, as the proposed financial plan drafted there
listed the fixture cost as $20,000 and the size of the fixture loan from Red Owl at $16,ooo. In the
September plan, the estimated fixture cost had been $30,000 and the estimated fixture loan was
$24,000. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 37.
124. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 43.
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to go into a business. Will see what I can do on more land cost. However,
Joe feels he cannot borrow anymore."l25
G. THE $26,000 PROPOSAL
Soon after December 6th, Lukowitz asked Hoffmann to meet him at
the Red Owl store in Appleton.", There Lukowitz showed Hoffmann a
telegram that he had received from somebody at Red Owl
headquarters.12" It said that if Hoffmann could come up with an
additional $2000, then Red Owl was ready to make a commitment."' Red
Owl was unable to find this telegram in pretrial discovery.'29 However,
during the trial, no representative of Red Owl denied that the telegram
existed.1o
Hoffmann did not immediately accept this proposal, instead telling
Lukowitz that he would have to find out if he could make an additional
$20oo available."' Several days later he discussed the situation with his
wife and father-in-law. 2 The father-in-law expressed a willingness to put
up $13,ooo and come into the venture as a partner.'3 3 Since Red Owl
wanted $26,000, Hoffmann would contribute the other $13,000.
Hoffmann intended to raise this money without taking out the $8ooo
loan from the Chilton bank.134
The record does not reveal all of the interactions between
Hoffmann and Lukowitz over the next month."' The record suggests that
once the father-in-law's offer to contribute $13,ooo was communicated to
Red Owl headquarters, officials there focused on getting the father-in-
law's agreement that the $13,000 would be either an outright gift or a
125. See id.
126. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 69-70.
127. Id. at 70.
128. See id.
129. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
13o. At the end of the trial, Red Owl put its house counsel, Richard Johnson, on the stand to
testify about his unsuccessful search for the telegram. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 346-47.
But none of the other Red Owl witnesses who could have been the author of the telegram (most
likely, Carlson or Hall) were asked about the telegram or denied that it existed. Lukowitz confirmed
discussing with Hoffmann the need for an additional $2ooo at this meeting, but he said that he did not
recall whether he had received a telegram from Red Owl headquarters. See id. at 215, 231.
131. Id. at 70.
132. Id. at 71.
133. See id. at 71, 77.
134. See id. at 71-73. On cross-examination Hoffmann indicated that his $13,000 would consist of
$5000 cash, $6ooo profit on the sale of the land, and a $2000 loan, secured by the bakery equipment,
from his old bank in Wautoma. Id. at xo8.
i35. Lukowitz, remaining enthusiastic about granting a franchise to Hoffmann, drafted a $26,1oo
plan that would raise the additional funds by having the builder buy the lot for an additional $2000, so
that Hoffmann would make a $6ooo "profit" on the sale of the lot. See id. at 72; see also Transcript of
Record, supra note £2, Ex. 33. The only communications from headquarters in the record indicate that
no decision had been reached on this plan. See id. Exs. 13, 14.
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loan subordinated to other creditors (of whom Red Owl would be by far
,6the largest)." However, this concern was not communicated to
Hoffmann. In late January, Lukowitz asked Hoffmann to arrange a
meeting between Lukowitz and the father-in-law.'3 7 Hoffmann did not
know that Lukowitz intended to ask Hoffmann's father-in-law to sign an
agreement with Red Owl that the $13,000 was a gift or a subordinated
loan to Hoffmann, given in consideration for Red Owl's extension of a
franchise."' Lukowitz did meet with Hoffmann, but the meeting with the
father-in-law did not happen, for reasons that are disputed in the
testimony by Hoffmann and Lukowitz.139 Nonetheless, shortly thereafter
Lukowitz sent a telegram to Minneapolis stating that the father-in-law
would sign an agreement that the $13,000 was either a gift or a loan
subordinated to other creditors. 40
H. THE FINAL PROPOSAL
A few days after Lukowitz's aborted meeting with Hoffmann's
father-in-law, Lukowitz invited Hoffmann to a meeting at the Appleton
Red Owl store with two officials from Red Owl headquarters: Herman
Carlson, who had been at both prior meetings in Chilton and
Minneapolis, and his superior, Frank Walker, an assistant vice president
and the manager of the Franchise Department. 4 ' Lukowitz had led
Hoffmann to expect that a deal could now be concluded because of the
increase in his father-in-law's contribution."' However, Carlson and
Walker presented Hoffmann with a new financing plan that came to be
136. Hall, Red Owl's credit manager, sent a telegram to Lukowitz, dated January 16, 1962, asking
for the father-in-law's name (Simon Vanden Heuvel), so that Hall could prepare an agreement to such
effect. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 47. Such an agreement was later drafted and
forwarded to Lukowitz to obtain a signature. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 220-21: see also
Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 47.
137. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
138. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 219, 285 (testimony of Lukowitz). It is not clear
whether Lukowitz had the agreement along at the time of his meeting with Hoffmann. though the
agreement was drafted. See Transcript of Record, supra note I2, Ex. 46. It was first shown to
Hoffmann when he met with headquarters officials in Appleton to receive their final proposal. See
infra note 144.
139. According to Lukowitz, Hoffmann stated that he did not want Lukowitz to meet with his
father-in-law. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 282. Hoffmann testified that his father-in-law
had an unexpected meeting and could not make the scheduled meeting with Lukowitz. See id. at 351.
We believe that Hoffmann's testimony on this point is the more credible.
140. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 20. Hoffmann testified that he had told Lukowitz
that, in return for putting up $13,ooo, his father-in-law wanted to be a partner. Transcript of Trial,
supra note 9, at 90. Lukowitz indicated that this would be okay and that he was sure a deal could now
be put together. Id. at 73, 90. But Lukowitz suggested that Hoffmann "not go into the partnership bit
with the front office." Id. at 90 (testimony of Hoffmann). The record does not indicate why Lukowitz
may have thought that the front office people might object to the partnership plan.
141. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 73.
142. See id.
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known as the $34,000 plan. 43 It required $13,000 from the father-in-law,
but also required Hoffmann to secure his father-in-law's consent to the
proposed agreement stating that the $13,000 would be a gift." It also
called for $5000 cash from Hoffmann, contribution of Hoffmann's bakery
equipment, loans of $8ooo from the Chilton bank and $2000 from the
Wautoma bank, and $6ooo profit on the sale of the land (also effectively
a loan). 45 As the following table comparing the three plans indicates, the
final plan contemplated an increased contribution by Hoffmann,
especially as compared to the second plan.146
TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF THE THREE PLANS
DENOTES AMOUNTS LISTED AS EQUITY CONTRIBUTION)
Contribution Sept. 27th Plan Nov. 22nd Plan Final Plan
Cash $36oo* $46oo* $5ooo*
Proceeds of Bakery Building $12,000* -
Resale of Lot 47  $3ooo* $4000 $6oo
Loan/Gift from Father-in-Law $7500 $7500 $13,000
Loan from Chilton Bank $8ooo $8ooo
Loan from Wautoma Bank - $2000
Bakery Inventory $15oo -
Bakery Equipment Value (and $19,500 ($7500) $17,500* $17,5oo*
encumbrance) ($8ooo) ($8ooo)
Total (using net value for bakery $39,600 $33,6o $43,500
equipment)____
143. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 34. The $34,ooo refers to the cash to be
contributed exclusive of the bakery equipment. See infra p. 825 tbl.3.
144. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 34. Hoffmann testified that this was the first time
he had learned of Red Owl's demand that his father-in-law agree to make his $13,ooo a gift. See
Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 8o-81, 354-57. Apparently, Hoffmann also was not informed that
Red Owl would have accepted an agreement from the father-in-law subordinating the loan, though
Red Owl officials testified that they would have accepted the latter, and telegrams exchanged with
Lukowitz in the days preceding this meeting made that clear. See id. at 326-28 (testimony of Hall);
Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 17. In a pretrial deposition, Hoffmann had appeared to
acknowledge seeing these telegrams, but at trial he denied seeing them. Transcript of Trial, supra note
9, at 356-58.
145. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 34. The plan also presumed used fixtures and
provided for a fixture loan from Red Owl of only $14,000. This further reduced Red Owl's investment
in the franchise when compared to the second plan. See supra note 123.
146. From Hoffmann's perspective, the final plan was also a substantial increase from the first
plan, after one accounts for the sale of the bakery building for less than market value and the reduced
valuation on the bakery equipment. See repro note II8 and accompanying text.
147. Recall that this "profit" was effectively a loan to Hoffmann from the builder. See repro note
8o and accompanying text.
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Hoffmann immediately objected to the final proposed plan, and
there was not much discussion about it.' The meeting was a short one.
On February 2, 1962, Hoffmann sent the following letter to Lukowitz:
Due to the generosity of my Father-in-Law, who agreed to give me
$13,000, we thought it would be possible to put a store in Chilton. He
agreed to this under the assumption that we could put this store
together with an available $26,ooo, which I assumed, due to
conversations with yourself, was the agreed upon amount. It now
seems apparent that the only way Red Owl will consider this store is if
I have $34,ooo available.
After doing my utmost to put this together for 2 1/2 years, it seems
to me Red Owls' demands have gotten beyond my power to fulfill.
Therefore, the only thing I can do at this time is drop the entire matter,
and try to make up the losses I suffered, due to your ill-advice.149
There was conflict in the testimony about what reasons Hoffmann
gave for rejecting the final plan when it was first presented to him at the
Appleton meeting. According to Walker, Hoffmann objected to having
to continue to borrow the $8ooo from the Chilton bank.' Walker
testified that Hoffmann said: "My father-in-law won't let me be in
debt."'"' Hoffmann testified that he gave as his reason: "I will not go to
my father-in-law and ask him for a $13,000 gift."'5 2 And according to the
uncontradicted testimony of Hoffmann, neither he nor anybody else ever
discussed with his father-in-law the possibility of making the contribution
a gift.'53
Hoffmann recalls today another reason why he called the deal off.
He remembers that he did not believe that Red Owl would grant him a
148. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 76-77.
149. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. 35. Hoffmann testified that before sending this letter,
he telephoned Hall, a Red Owl official with whom he met in Minneapolis but who had not been at the
Appleton meeting, and asked whether it would be possible to put Hoffmann into a smaller store.
Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 79-80. Hall said that it was "this store or none." See id. According
to Hoffmann, Hall also said that "this thing has gotten a little goofed up," and said that the people in
Green Bay (which would mean Lukowitz) had been "severely reprimanded." See id. Hall testified that
he did not remember this telephone call. He denied ever telling Hoffmann that Lukowitz had been
reprimanded, and he also denied ever actually reprimanding Lukowitz. Id. at 323-24.
i5o. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 334.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 355.
153. Id. Hoffmann did not testify about why he was unwilling to ask his father-in-law to make a
gift. In response to our questions in our interviews with him, Hoffmann stated that it is possible that
his wife's siblings would have been concerned if the money had been designated as a gift, but he does
not remember that being an explicit concern at the time. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann,
supra note 97. We asked the questions because at trial Hoffmann's lawyer had asked Hoffmann's wife,
Shirley, about her siblings. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 251. In response to an objection to the
question's relevance, Hoffmann's lawyer suggested that making the $13,000 a gift would raise issues
about equity in the distribution of the estate among siblings. Id. at 255-56. The trial judge nonetheless
sustained the objection and so we learn nothing about Shirley's siblings from the transcript, though in
fact she had several. Id. at 256.
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franchise even if he had agreed to the $34,000 plan.154 Ever since the
meeting in Minneapolis, he had been skeptical that Red Owl wanted to
grant him a franchise on any conditions. He had gone to the meeting in
Minneapolis with the expectation that the deal would be concluded, only
to be told that he would need more money. Then he had been told by
Lukowitz, who showed Hoffmann a telegram from headquarters to that
effect, that $26,ooo would suffice and he went to the Appleton meeting
with that expectation, only to be disappointed again. To this day
Hoffmann suspects that if he had agreed to the $34,000 plan, there would
have been a later demand for even more money.'
I. THE AFTERMATH
After Hoffmann called off the negotiations in February 1962, he
continued to work at the Elm Tree Bakery to support his family while he
searched for other career opportunities.s 6 By Christmas 1962, he was
accepted as a sales agent by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.' In
January 1963, after a brief training, he began working, largely for
commissions.' In the meantime, the buyer of the bakery business in
Wautoma began falling behind on his payments.' Sometime during 1964
to 1965, Hoffmann applied to Metropolitan Life for a transfer to the
Wautoma area.'TM He hoped that he could take over management of the
bakery while still selling insurance.' 6' This would allow him to recover
some of his investment in the bakery business. The Wautoma position
went to somebody else, however.'12 In the end, Hoffmann received only a
small part of the money he was promised for the sale of the bakery
business.' The bakery equipment that was designated for the Chilton
store remained in Wautoma and was never sold, further enhancing
Hoffmann's losses from giving up the bakery business.'64
154. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
155. There was some testimony to this effect at trial as well. On cross-examination of Hoffmann,
Red Owl's lawyer tried to establish that Hoffmann understood that if he had accepted the $34,000
plan, Red Owl would "put you in the store." See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 127. Hoffmann
responded, "They had told me numerous times, on different figures, they were ready to go ahead. If I
said 34,000 I don't know where it would have went. They had definitely told me a number of times
previous to that 26,ooo would be sufficient." Id. at 128. Immediately after this answer, Red Owl's
attorney ended the cross-examination. Id.






x62. Id. The job went to Ed Wrysinski, Hoffmann's former employee who had purchased the





However, Hoffmann's life insurance career was a great success. By
mid-1965 he was promoted to agency manager in the Appleton area. By
1968 he was transferred to Indiana, where he soon became district
manager for Lafayette. 6 5 He was successful in this position and in the
early 1970s he became district manager for St. Joseph, Michigan, where
Metropolitan Life had more business than in Lafayette.'6 Joe stayed in
this position until he retired in the mid-i98os.'" In the meantime, Shirley
had started to sell real estate. 68 Shortly after they moved to St. Joseph,
she started her own agency, Red Arrow Realty, which quickly became
successful. 69 Joe joined the business upon his retirement from
Metropolitan Life. 70 Today the business is owned by one of Joe and
Shirley's nine children, while Joe and Shirley continue to work as
agents.'7' They lead a comfortable life surrounded by many children and
grandchildren.172
Red Owl never opened a store in Chilton. Hoffmann never
completed his purchase of the Chilton lot, which reverted to the seller.
Hoffmann reports that a supermarket was built across the street by
somebody else and has been successful."
III. THE TRIAL
Joe and Shirley Hoffmann retained G. H. (Gerry) Van Hoof and
John Wiley, lawyers from Little Chute, a small town near Appleton.' 4 A
complaint was filed on October II, 1962, in Outagamie County Court,
which is located in Appleton. The defendants were both Red Owl and
Lukowitz."' The complaint alleged that, through Lukowitz, Red Owl had
both agreed to and represented that they would build and stock a Red
Owl store in Chilton for Hoffmann to operate, in return for Hoffmann's
investment of $18,ooo. The damages claimed were $30,ooo. David Fulton
of Appleton represented both Lukowitz and Red Owl.' 6 He filed an
answer that put in issue both the alleged agreement and representation.
However, he did not question Lukowitz's authority to bind Red Owl in
either way. There was extensive discovery and depositions. Trial before a
165. Id.
166. See id.; Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 20.







174. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at I.
175. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 102.
176. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at i.
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jury began on October 21, 1963."' The case went to the jury in the
afternoon of the fourth day of trial."' The jury returned a verdict,
described below, after only three hours of deliberation.'7 9 The witnesses
examined most extensively were Hoffmann and Lukowitz.
Midway through the trial, the judge essentially directed a verdict on
the contract issue, holding that too many terms still had to be determined
about the store in Chilton to allow Hoffmann to go to the jury on that
claim."o With respect to the alternative "representation" claim, the trial
judge decided to submit a special verdict.'8' Fulton (Red Owl's attorney)
objected that contract was the only permissible theory of liability,"' a
point he also argued vociferously in a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and on appeal.
Over the course of the trial, and during discussion about the form of
the special verdict, the trial judge made two determinations adverse to
Hoffmann's case. First, Van Hoof had intended to introduce evidence
about losses on the sale of the bakery business to an employee. 8 3 The
theory for why there was a loss was that, like the Wautoma grocery and
the bakery building, it had been sold on a fire sale basis, without an
opportunity to market the asset to the highest bidder.' In his proffer of
evidence, Van Hoof estimated the loss at $6ooo.'' However, the bakery
business was the property of Joe and Shirley Hoffmann's wholly owned
corporation, Tasty Bakery, Inc.'"' This corporation was not a party to the
case. As a result, the trial judge disallowed any evidence on the loss of
the sale of the bakery business.'87 The Hoffmanns' claim for profits from
the grocery store over the summer of 1961 prompted another adverse
ruling. The theory of loss on the sale of the grocery store was that there
was a difference between the fair market value of the store if sold to the
highest bidder and the actual sale price to Hoffmann's employee. 88
However, the trial judge reasoned that there would be a double recovery
177. See id.
178. Id. at 364, 378.
179. Id. at 380.
18o. See id. at 272. Van Hoof did not contest this determination.
181. Id. at 274-75.
182. Id. ("It is our position that as a matter of law. . . a contract is necessary in order to form the
foundation for any recovery, on any theory, by the plaintiffs in this action. . . . I maintain that the
plaintiffs cannot establish a case on the basis of estoppel or on any theory other than the contract
theory . . . .").
183. Id. at 239.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 236-37.
187. Id. at 237-39. The judge also denied Van Hoof's motion to amend the complaint to add the
corporation as a party.
188. This theory of loss was made clear in the judge's charge to the jury. See id. at 376.
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if he allowed Hoffmann to recover lost profits over the summer.t Those
profits would have been incorporated into the fair market value of the
store.[90
The trial transcript does not include the lawyers' closing arguments.
All counsel are now deceased, so we have no way of knowing what they
argued. The trial judge's instructions did not devote much attention to
what constituted a "representation," other than to state that they are to
be distinguished from "[m]ere expressions of opinions."'91The
instructions did specify that in considering whether Hoffmann, in the
exercise of ordinary care, ought to have relied on any presentation, the
jury should consider Hoffmann's "business experience, knowledge, and
background."' 92 Perhaps most significantly, the trial judge was careful to
189. Id. at 270.
190. See id
191. See id. at 370. One of the oddities of the case is that the charge used the term
"representation," though the case is now understood to be based on promissory estoppel. The
difference between the term "representation" and the term "promise," if any, is not a matter that
concerned the trial judge or litigants. The parties at several places throughout the trial exhibited an
understanding that Hoffmann's noncontract theory was based on estoppel. Van Hoof (Hoffmann's
counsel) called the theory "estoppel in pais." Id. at 277. By the time of Red Owl's motion for judgment
notwithstanding a verdict, their attorney (Fulton) was referring to the theory as promissory estoppel,
and citing standard authorities (for example, Corbin on Contracts) on this theory. See Defendants'
Outline Brief on Motions After Verdict at 3, in Transcript of Record, supra note 12. The essence of his
argument was that to constitute a "promise" for purposes of promissory estoppel, the promise must be
definite enough that it could form a contract if there were acceptance, consideration, etc.:
The Court satisfied itself that no contract resulted from the negotiations between the parties
and we submit that for the same reasons it should conclude that the essentials of a
Promissory Estoppel have not been proved. Even under the more liberal view, there must
be at least a definite and specific promise such as would be sufficient for a contract. That
point was simply never reached under the undisputed evidence of this case!
This is nothing more or less than a case of continuing negotiations with modifications and
changes accepted by the plaintiff himself for whatever reason, but which ultimately failed to
ripen into a contract.
Id. at 9-To.
192. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 372. Scott implicitly criticizes this part of the charge, on
the ground that what he calls the "subjective/objective test of reasonable reliance" is normally limited
to fraudulent misrepresentation. See Scott, supra note 14, at 87. Perhaps, however, the trial court's
instruction can be defended as consistent with conventional objective theory: "[O]bjective
manifestations of intent of the party should generally be viewed from the vantage point of a
reasonable person in the position of the other party." JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS 24 (6th ed. 2009).
In Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co., the court said: "[I]t is what the parties manifest to each other
that controls and not an undisclosed secret intent." 253 N.W. 584, 589 (Wis. 1934); see also Wayne
Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. QN. L. REv. 11I9, 1130 (2oo8) ("Subjective, internal
equivocations or doubts are of no consequence to the parties' contractual affairs and thus cannot
create havoc in the parties' reasonable expectations."). Ed Lukowitz, Red Owl's agent, knew about
the level of Joe Hoffmann's business experience. his financial situation, and, most importantly, that the
bakery provided the livelihood for Hoffmann's family. we do not think that the jury was instructed
about Hoffmann's uncommunicated, subjective understandings about Lukowitz's reassurances. An
abstract "reasonable person" in Hoffmann's position would not be somebody who was experienced in
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charge the jury that they were to award damages only if the
representations were made and relied upon before the damage occurred,
and in this respect he directed attention to the time difference between
the sale of the grocery (June 6, 1961) and the sale of the bakery building
(November 6, i96i).'9
There was discussion about the form of the questions, which
ultimately were formulated as follows (the questions are followed by the
answers provided by the jury):'94
(3) Did Red Owl Stores make representations to Joseph Hoffmann
that if he fulfilled certain conditions that they would establish him as
a franchise operator of a Red Owl store in Chilton? 95 (Yes)
(4) Did Joseph Hoffmann rely on said representations and was he
induced to act thereon?"' (Yes)
(5) Ought Joseph Hoffmann, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have
relied on said representations?" (Yes)
(6) Did Joseph Hoffmann fulfill all the conditions he was required to
fulfill by the terms of the negotiations between the parties up to
January 26, 1962?198 (Yes)
(7) What sum of money will reasonably compensate the plaintiffs for
such damages as they sustained by reason of:
(a) The sale of the Wautoma store fixtures and inventory? ($16,735)
(b) The sale of the bakery building? ($2000)
(c) Taking up the option on the Chilton lot? ($iooo)
(d) Expenses of moving his family to Neenah? ($140)
(e) House rental in Chilton?' 99 ($125)
The sum of the items of damage that the jury awarded total $20,000.
It seems reasonable to assume that the jury decided that $20,000 was an
appropriate verdict. Since the amount of loss associated with all the items
negotiating franchise contracts, and is not likely to have viewed Ed Lukowitz's assurances with any
greater skepticism than Hoffmann did. In fact, we think that Hoffmann was above average in his
sophistication as compared with other businesspeople in Wisconsin small towns. And Lukowitz did
business with small-town Wisconsin businesspeople on a daily basis.
193. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 375-76.
194. We omit the first two questions, which were answered by the court. The first question was
whether the parties initiated negotiations looking to the establishment of a Red Owl Store in Chilton
(answered yes), and the second was whether the parties had mutually agreed on all of the details so as
to have reached a final agreement thereon (answered no). Id. at 369.
195. Id. at 369-70.
196. Id. at 370.
197. Id. at 372.
198. Id- at 372-73. The reason for the date was Van Hoof's concern that Hoffmann had not
fulfilled the final condition that his father-in-law's $13,000 be a gift. See id. at 359--60. By inserting the
date, the court intended to limit the question to conditions negotiated prior to the final meeting in
Appleton, when Hoffmann testified he first learned of the gift requirement.
199. Id. at 375-77.
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of potential damage, other than the sale of the grocery store, was pretty
clear on the evidence, it seems likely the jury just subtracted those
amounts from $20,ooo and assigned the difference to the grocery store.
The trial judge immediately questioned whether there was an evidentiary
basis for the damages awarded with respect to the grocery store.' When
ruling on Red Owl's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
approximately five months later, the trial judge set this part of the verdict
aside and ordered a new trial, limited to that item of damage."
IV. THE APPEAL
Red Owl filed its notice of appeal on June 25, 1964. According to
Hoffmann, there were no settlement negotiations between the parties at
this time.202 Hoffmann cross-appealed the trial judge's order setting aside
the damages award on the Wautoma store. Hoffmann did not appeal the
trial judge's exclusion of evidence on the sale of the bakery business.
Instead, the corporation that owned the bakery business, Tastee Bakery,
Inc., filed a separate suit against Red Owl and Lukowitz.' Trial of this
case was postponed to await the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision.
A. RED OWL'S BRIEF
Red Owl's brief in the supreme court argued strongly that
promissory estoppel was not available in this case because a "promise"
had never been made by Red Owl, emphasizing the many terms that
were yet to be negotiated and agreed upon.20' Wisconsin courts had not
previously expressly endorsed the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and
so the brief relied largely on secondary authorities to argue that the
doctrine required a promise sufficiently definite that it could lead to an
enforceable contract.?5 It then detailed the many matters that remained
to be agreed upon throughout the negotiation. Importantly, these
included the terms of the lease of the building to Hoffmann (which lease
Red Owl would guarantee) and the source of Hoffmann's funds.2 6
2oo. Id. at 379.
2o. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 42-48. The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in
Hoffman also reports this posttrial order. See 133 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Wis. 1965).
202. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 1o2.
203. Letter from G. H. Van Hoof, Attorney for Joseph Hoffmann, to Ian R. Macneil, Professor,
Cornell Law School (July Lo, 1965) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). We were later provided
with a copy of the letter by Mr. Van Hoof.
204. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at 40-52.
205. Id. at 35-39.
2o6. The brief justified the relevance of the source of funds in this way:
The make-up of the $iS,ooo . . . was important because of the necessary relationship
between borrowed and unborrowed capital to the success of any business,.. .since the
share of the profits of a small town grocery might well not be sufficient to support a man
with a large family and an operator without adequate personal income would not likely be a
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Red Owl advanced two arguments to the effect that the trial court
should have directed a verdict against Hoffmann's claim for damages on
the sale of the Wautoma grocery store, rather than ordering a new trial
on this claim. The first argument stressed that with respect to each item
of damage, "it becomes necessary to review the status of the claimed
assurances at the times of the various acts which [Hoffmann] claims he
did to his detriment."" The gist of the argument was that the agreement
was especially indefinite on June 6, 1961, when Hoffmann sold the
grocery store. The second argument was that Hoffmann had not
presented any credible evidence that there were losses in connection with
the sale of the store.20 The evidence showed that the store was sold for
about what Hoffmann had paid for it. The theory of Hoffmann's
damages claim was that the sale, on short notice, was for less than its fair
market value. Hoffmann offered no direct evidence, such as an appraisal,
of its fair market value. Red Owl argued strenuously that a new trial
should not be offered to allow Hoffmann to present a better case, and
that on the record as presented, there was no basis for finding that
Hoffmann suffered any losses on the sale of the grocery.70
Red Owl advanced an extensive argument on the equities of the
case, under the premise that section 90 of the Restatement, the
promissory estoppel rule, requires enforcement only if "injustice" will
result from non-enforcement of the promise:
[I]t is clear ... that Hoffmann has no just cause for complaint. On his
own testimony, in June of 1961, in September and in November of that
year he sold properties and made commitments at times when he
certainly must have known that there were many items yet to be agreed
upon .... At each stage he had a choice of either insisting upon a firm
contract before he acted to his alleged detriment or of electing to
continue the negotiations, gambling on the possibility that the parties
might eventually reach an impasse. Clearly, he elected the latter
course ....
While plaintiffs would like it to appear that Red Owl was engaged in
some nefarious plot to do the plaintiffs out of their property, any such
view is wholly unrealistic. Red Owl is in the business of selling
groceries. The more stores and agency outlets it has the more groceries
successful one.... [I]t would not be to the interest of either Hoffman or Red Owl for this
particular agency to either fail or be so undercapitalized as to be unable to furnish adequate
service to the public and to merchandise competitively.
Id at 42-43.
207. Id. at 41.
2o8. Id. at 54.
2o9. Id. at 54-59. At trial Hoffmann had offered the testimony of Wrysinski, the employee who
had purchased the grocery, about his profits earned over the summer of 1961, the peak retail season in
Wautoma. The testimony was offered on the theory that one could imply that the fair market value
would have been higher in June if profits were imminent. However, Wrysinski did not present any
evidence about what his net profits were, but rather only evidence about his gross receipts for that
period. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 142-50.
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it sells. Therefore, it has every incentive to work toward the completion
of such deals as this. On the other hand, Red Owl must extend credit
for merchandise and fixtures, and presumably in this case would have
been obliged to guarantee the lease. Also, it has the reputation and
public image of all its stores to consider. It would have done neither
Red Owl nor Hoffmann any good to set up a store that was either
doomed to failure because of undercapitalization or which because of
excessive overhead for such things as interest and rental payments
could not afford ... to give good service to the public.... There was
nothing unreasonable about the so-called final demands of Red
Owl....
The $8,ooo Chilton Bank loan which he objected to at the final
meeting was something that had appeared in previous projections to
which he had been agreeable. The matter of the $13,000 from the
father-in-law appears never to have been thoroughly explored or
discussed at the time that Hoffmann threw up the deal.... [H]e had an
$i8,ooo home, subject to a $12,800 mortgage, which he could have sold
without hardship, since it had become a rental property.... The point
is, of course, that due to Hoffmann's own arbitrary impatience these
items were never explored. He persisted, wrong-headedly, in looking at
the capital requirements as some sort of "price" of $34,000 which Red
Owl was attempting to exact from him. Actually, however, this was not
money that was to be paid to Red Owl but was capital which he would
keep and use for himself in his own business. All in all,
therefore ... there is no "injustice" in charging Hoffmann with the
consequences of his own failure to require a firm contract before
disposing of his property and in impetuously breaking off the
negotiations.2"D
B. HOFFMANN'S BRIEF
Hoffmann's brief is not nearly so extensive, but it made some points
worth noting. In its restatement of the facts, it emphasized that while the
financial demands on Hoffmann kept going up over the course of the
various plans, the financial commitment of Red Owl to the Chilton store
went down, primarily because Red Owl had reduced the amount of the
fixtures loan after used fixtures had been located."' And it referred to
testimony by Hoffmann "that the greater amount of money put in by
Hoffmanns, the lesser the hurt to Red Owl should the store go bad, that
he understood that if something went wrong they took over and all of his
money would be lost."2 I2 The legal argument rested entirely on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel but did not address the question whether
a promise that was too indefinite or incomplete to form a contract could
nonetheless be the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.2 1 3 At one point,
21o. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at 49-52 (citation omitted).
211. Respondents' Brief at 8, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (No.
'4954).
212. Id. at 9-To.
213. The brief did stress that many details of a proposed franchise had been agreed upon, such as
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they implied that the problem underlying the case may have been that
Red Owl's doubts about Hoffmann had not been communicated to
Hoffmann by Lukowitz: "The trouble is, [Lukowitz] communicated
confidence to the Hoffmanns but failed to disclose any Red Owl doubts.
And of course Red Owl is bound by his statements and course of conduct
as the acts of an agent."" 4
Hoffmann's argument on the equities of the case was as follows:
Red Owl's claimed expertise in this field of setting up agency stores put
the burden on them to prevent such substantial changes of position
which they claim now to not have desired. Could not Red Owl have set
up the Chilton store without Hoffmanns being required to rid
themselves of all means of livelihood? Why didn't Red Owl purchase
the option on the lot in Chilton? There can be no other inference but
that Red Owl wanted Hoffmanns to "burn their bridges", so they
would have no choice but to comply with any further demands of Red
Owl, however unreasonable.... Perhaps the explanation was that Red
Owl wanted Hoffmanns very badly to be franchise operators of a new
Red Owl Store in Chilton, Wisconsin, and therefore wanted to put
them in a position where they would have no choice, or perhaps Red
Owl had bad experiences elsewhere with new franchise operators and
wanted extra protection for itself. In either case, Red Owl's actions
were. . . not characterized by full and fair disclosure or fair dealings
which would be required for it to have "clean hands" in equity.2"s
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In the end, a unanimous supreme court affirmed the trial court's
judgment, including the order for a new trial on the issue of damages for
the sale of the grocery store."' In the course of the opinion, the court
adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the law of Wisconsin.' It
also expressly addressed Red Owl's primary contention that there
needed to be a promise sufficiently definite that it could lead to a
contract if other elements existed. The court described the
representations found by the jury as "promissory" and simply stated that
it is not a requirement for promissory estoppel that
the used fixtures, downplaying in that way the degree to which the deal was incomplete. Id. at 24-26.
214. Id. at 27. Hoffmann's brief also made various arguments that the evidence supported the
jury's verdict on damages with respect to the Wautoma grocery, and hence that the verdict in this
respect should not have been overturned. See id. at 28-31.
215. Id. at 27-28.
216. Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 275, 277.
217. Id. at 273-74. The court noted that one of our predecessors as a teacher of contracts at the
University of Wisconsin Law School, the legendary William Herbert Page, had stated in his 1933
annotations to the Restatement of Contracts: "The Wisconsin cases do not seem to be in accord with
this section [section 90] of the Restatement. It is certain that no such proposition has ever been
announced by the Wisconsin court and it is at least doubtful if it would be approved by the court." Id.
at 273 (quoting WILLIAM H. PAGE, WiscoNsiN ANNOTATIONS To RESTATEMENT OF CONTRrncrs 53 (i933)).
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the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so
comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that
would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee.
We deem it would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on
promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of contract
action.... [l]t is desirable that fluidity in the application of the concept
be maintained.2"'
It is this part of the holding that has made Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores a
famous case throughout the country, credited with starting a new and
controversial line of precedent allowing recovery for precontractual
reliance when negotiations abort thereafter.
The opinion does not contain an extensive discussion of the
evidence to identify what might be considered a "promise" under this
lesser standard. It does state:
The record here discloses a number of promises and assurances
given to Hoffman by Lukowitz in behalf of Red Owl upon which
plaintiffs relied and acted upon to their detriment.
Foremost were the promises that for the sum of $18,ooo Red Owl
would establish Hoffmann in a store.
We determine that there was ample evidence to sustain the answers
of the jury to the questions of the verdict with respect to promissory
representations made by Red Owl, Hoffman's reliance thereon in the
exercise of ordinary care, and his fulfillment of the conditions required
of him by the terms of the negotiations had with Red Owl.2 9
With respect to damages, the court did not address either of the two
arguments advanced by Red Owl to the effect that there should have
been a directed verdict with respect to liability for a loss on the sale of
the Wautoma store. Instead, the court ordered a new trial on this item of
damages, measured by the difference between the fair market value and
actual sale price of the store-the same measure charged by the trial
judge.220 The supreme court agreed that there was no evidence in the
record to sustain the jury's verdict and commented that the record
contained no direct evidence of the fair market value of the store on the
date of its sale. 22'
218. Id. at 275.
219. Id. at 274.
220. Id. at 276-77.
221. Id. In the course of its opinion on this issue, the court opined that damages in promissory
estoppel could be limited to recovery of reliance expenditures. See id. At the time of the decision, this
statement was also precedent setting, although it is settled law today. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 9o (1981) ("The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.") That
sentence was not in section 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts. It is ironic that this case has
influenced the development of the law on this point as well, since nobody has ever contended that
Hoffmann had a possible claim for expectation damages -that is, lost profits from the Chilton store
that was never established. For a recent article discussing remedies under promissory estoppel, see
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D. RETRIAL
After the supreme court's decision, Red Owl conceded liability in
the Tastee Bakery, Inc. v. Red Owl case that had been filed shortly after
conclusion of the first trial.2 22 The damages in that case, concerning the
sale of the bakery business, were combined with the remanded issue
concerning damages on the sale of the Wautoma grocery store. 23
Hoffmann recalls that the new trial was not going well for Red Owl when
they initiated settlement discussions during the second day of the trial.224
After one and one-half days of trial, the case was settled for $Lo,600."
This amount is substantially more than the damages awards affirmed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which totaled only $3265."' We suspect
that the difference reflected mostly evidence that Hoffmann sold the
bakery business at substantially below its fair market value, but we do
not know. Because there was a settlement, no transcript was ever made
of the second trial.
The Hoffmanns' share of the settlement, after attorney fees, was
about $6500.22' At the time of the settlement Joe Hoffmann's life
insurance career was in its infancy, and he and his wife had seven
children. The Hoffmanns used the settlement proceeds for daily living
228
expenses.
V. SUMMING UP: WHAT WAS MOTIVATING THE PARTIES?
In this Part we attempt to provide insight into what was motivating
the parties over the course of their interactions.
A. HOFFMANN
Hoffmann's motives are easy to understand. He was a young man
who had had considerable success in building his Wautoma bakery
business. There were, however, limits to how much a bakery could grow
in such a small town. Hoffmann wanted more. Originally, he wanted to
open a store in Wautoma where he was well known. However, Red Owl
Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REv. 669 (20o0). For discussion of a recent federal
decision applying Wisconsin law and allowing expectation damages in facts similar in many respects to
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, see infra note 300.
222. See Letter from G. H. Van Hoof to Ian R. Macneil, supra note 203.
223. Id.
224. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 20.
225. Letter from G. H. Van Hoof to William C. Whitford (Mar. 21, 1970) (on file with the Hastings
Law Journal), quoted in I MACAULAY, KIDWELL & WHITFORD, supra note 6, at 403-04. The record
contains a stipulation by the parties settling the lawsuit, indicating that stipulation was reached on
November 9. 1965. See Stipulation and Order for Dismissal, in Transcript of Record, supra note 32.
226. See Hoffmann, 333 N.w.2d at 275-76.
227. Letter from G. H. Van Hoof to William C. Whitford, supra note 225.
228. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
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officials wanted a store in a bigger town, and he was willing to move.
Hoffmann at all times exhibited a keen awareness of the limited
resources available to him, and he was concerned about excessive debt.
At the beginning of his dealings with Red Owl, he thought that he could
invest $18,ooo. He could get this by investing his approximately $io,ooo
savings plus $7500 that he would borrow from his father-in-law. In
addition, he expected to use bakery equipment not needed in Wautoma
in the new enterprise.
Red Owl's demands for more money and more sacrifices kept
increasing. When Red Owl suggested that Hoffmann sell the Wautoma
grocery in 1961, Hoffmann sought reassurance that his $18,ooo would be
enough to get him set up. Upon receiving it, he went along with the
suggestion because Red Owl wanted him free to work on the new
franchise over the summer. The next big Red Owl demand was that the
Hoffmanns sell the Wautoma bakery.' The record is very clear that
Hoffmann and his wife questioned Lukowitz carefully about whether a
deal was in hand before they agreed to sell the bakery business and
building, and they were told that their continued ownership of the bakery
and building was "the only hitch."'23 The decision to sell the business was
a big one. The family was giving up what had been their livelihood, and
they were committing to moving from Wautoma. And the reassurance
from Lukowitz was credible. Hoffmann had already met with officials
from headquarters at the proposed lot in Chilton. They had information
about his financial condition, and they had drafted the first proposed
financial plan. Lukowitz represented that he had communicated with
those officials before reassuring Hoffmann.
Hoffmann was not asked to contribute significantly more at the
November meeting in Minneapolis, but he was warned that demands for
more resources would be forthcoming. A few weeks later, when he
received the demand to come up with an additional $2000 in order to
close the deal, he did not immediately commit but agreed to consider it.
After all, it was not all that much more money. But Hoffmann's fiscal
caution is illustrated by his unwillingness just to agree immediately.
In this context, the demand for a significantly greater investment at
the late January meeting in Appleton proved to be far too much. It was
the second time (Minneapolis being the first) that Hoffmann went to a
meeting with headquarters officials having been assured by Lukowitz
that everything was set, only to be faced with a demand for a greater
investment. For Hoffmann, the critical question was always his total
investment; whether the funds invested were borrowed and unborrowed
229. Before that, Hoffmann purchased the option on the Chilton lot. Hoffmann also sought and
received reassurance from Lukowitz before making this investment.
230. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 57.
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did not matter much. As he pointed out in his testimony, if the store
failed, Red Owl would take it over and operate it, and Hoffmann would
get no return for his investment."' Yet Hoffmann would remain liable on
any debt incurred and then invested in the new store. The demand that
the father-in-law's contribution be a gift was also unsettling to Joe, for
reasons not totally clear to us, but which may have been related to his
concerns that his wife's siblings might have feared that Joe and Shirley
would ultimately get more than a pro rata share of the father-in-law's
estate.232
The Hoffmanns' decision to sue may have been partly motivated by
vindication. Certainly, they felt wronged. Their unsuccessful effort to
obtain a Red Owl franchise had fundamentally changed their life. They
were able to hire a lawyer on a contingency basis,233 so they did not have
to invest any funds on a lawsuit whose success must have seemed
problematic. In the end, they got a small recovery, which helped them
meet living expenses for a large family during the lean years, while Joe
was establishing himself in his new profession in life insurance sales and
Shirley was just getting started in real estate sales.
B. ED LUKOWITZ
We choose to offer an account of the motivations of Ed Lukowitz
separate from the rest of the Red Owl management because Lukowitz's
motives are easier to understand and were probably different from the
motives of the other Red Owl officials. Lukowitz was a new divisional
manager at the time he first began offering encouragement to Hoffmann
in the fall of 1960. Previously, he had been a district manager for ten
years. One major new responsibility of a divisional manager concerned
the establishment of new stores, and it appears that Lukowitz took that
responsibility very seriously.234 It is also clear that Lukowitz became a
231. See id. at 115-16. Hoffmann pointed out that Red Owl's ability to take over the store was
clearly implied by their projected guarantee of his lease on the Chilton store. See id. This point was
also emphasized in Hoffmann's brief to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See Respondents' Brief, supra
note 211, at 9-10.
At trial, Frank Walker, Red Owl's Franchise Department manager, testified that he tried to
persuade Hoffmann that he would have complete control over the additional $8ooo that Red Owl was
asking him to borrow. "It's your money . . . . Joe, if after a reasonable length of time these funds aren't
used give them back; give it back to the bank . . . ." Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 333. But
Walker also testified that the funds were intended to provide Hoffmann some cushion should the store
not be immediately profitable. Id. Since Red Owl would be both directly (for inventory, and on the
fixtures' financing) and indirectly (as guarantor on the lease) a major creditor of Hoffmann, they
would benefit directly from the expenditure of the funds. And if Hoffmann invested the additional
$8ooo in ongoing costs before the store failed, he would remain liable on the loan and have nothing to
show for the extra investment.
232. See supra note 153.
233. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 1o2.
234. Scott speculates that Lukowitz would have earned a commission if the deal had gone through.
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strong advocate for Hoffmann within the Red Owl hierarchy. Hoffmann
today remembers Lukowitz as "a real decent guy [who] had my interest
at heart."235 Lukowitz not only had gotten to know Hoffmann and
observe how he managed the Wautoma bakery and grocery, but he had a
sense of how well Hoffmann was regarded in the Wautoma community.
And Lukowitz's judgment was probably correct. Hoffmann became a
great success in the life insurance business. Hoffmann believes he would
have been a successful operator of a Red Owl grocery in Chilton.
At the same time, the record suggests that at times Lukowitz may
have gone further in reassuring Hoffmann than was justified by the
communications Lukowitz had with his superiors at headquarters. This is
particularly true of the time when Hoffmann exercised the option to buy
the Chilton lot and when the Hoffmanns sold the bakery business.'13
Perhaps Lukowitz was reluctant to warn Hoffmann of the risks he was
taking, for fear that Hoffmann, ever cautious about financial matters,
would simply withdraw. Perhaps Lukowitz, a relative newcomer as a
divisional manager, was overly optimistic that everything would work
out, and hence thought there would be no harm in getting the Hoffmanns
to overcome their caution.
Lukowitz denied that he had reassured Hoffmann at the time of the
exercise of the option on the Chilton lot. "I told him we weren't quite
ready yet and had too many details to work out.... I had to find out
from Hopkins. This had to come from above.""' Lukowitz was never
directly asked at trial about conversations he had with Hoffmann at the
time they were advised to sell the bakery building and business.
Lukowitz's testimony about the strength of the reassurances that he gave
Hoffmann appears to us as that of a Red Owl employee who wanted to
See Scott, supra note 14, at 93. There is nothing in the record to support that speculation, but it could
be true (and we have heard the same assumption made by other contracts teachers). Lukowitz was a
divisional manager in charge of over eighty franchises in upper Michigan and Wisconsin. Transcript of
Trial, supra note 9, at 172. Whether or not he received a commission for each new franchise, it is likely
that he received bonuses based on overall sales within his division. But the addition of a small store in
Chilton is not likely to have had a great impact on overall sales.
235. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 20. Hoffmann adds that Lukowitz's
attitude changed at trial, when "he had his job more at heart." Id.
236. The most important officials appear to be Walter Hall, the credit manager, who met with
Hoffmann at the Minneapolis meeting in November 1961, and Frank Walker, an assistant vice
president and manager for the Franchise Department. The evidence suggests that both Hall and
Walker examined the Hoffmann file during October and advised that Hoffmann would need to sell
the bakery. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, Ex. iI (telegram from Carlson to Lukowitz
indicating that Walker had examined the file), see also id. Exs. 9, Jo (letter and telegram, respectively,
from Lukowitz to Hall about Hoffmann's financial situation). But there is no evidence in the record
that either of these officials had told Lukowitz that sale of the bakery was "the only hitch." Lukowitz
told Hoffmann he had been so informed, however, and it is possible there had been a phone call not in
the record to such effect. Cf Transcript of Trial, supra note 8, at 57. Any telegrams or other written
communication to such effect would likely have been turned up in discovery and introduced at trial.
237. Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 188
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keep his job.238 The entire story suggests that Joe Hoffmann was a
cautious man, and strong reassurances were needed to persuade him to
do what Ed Lukowitz thought that he should do.
C. RED OWL
On appeal, Red Owl maintained that their primary concern was the
amount of "equity capital" that Hoffmann would invest. They argued
that their demands in that respect had not measurably increased over the
course of their interactions with Hoffmann, as the final financial plan
required only $i8,ooo in unencumbered cash-$5ooo from Hoffmann
and $13,000 from his father-in-law.' A franchisor can have a legitimate
interest in requiring investment of equity. An overleveraged investor
may feel free to walk away from the investment at little cost to itself,
essentially stiffing any creditors. A franchisee/investor feeling this way
may act in an insufficiently risk-averse (or overly speculative) manner.
These incentives are not consonant with the interests of the franchisor,
who is an important creditor of the franchisee and who has long-term
interests in brand reputation to protect.240
Red Owl may have had a corporate policy requiring a minimum
investment of "equity," and corporate officers in Minneapolis may have
had difficulty in justifying a franchise for Hoffmann under that policy.
All the proposed financial plans identified certain parts of the proposed
investment as "equity" and seemed concerned that the "equity capital"
totaled approximately $18,ooo. This would suggest that there was some
kind of corporate commitment or policy that needed to be satisfied.
However, it was only on appeal that Red Owl suggested that it was
important that all the "equity capital" contributed by Hoffmann be
unencumbered cash. During the important time when Hoffmann was
making his arrangements, all communications to Hoffmann suggested a
much more flexible requirement as to what would constitute "equity
238. This is Hoffmann's current assessment of Lukowitz's testimony. Telephone Interview with
Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 20.
239. This argument was noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965). This was not an argument made in Red Owl's brief, but perhaps
it was made at oral argument. We do not have a transcript of the argument.
240. In comments on Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores in the contracts casebook that he coedits, Scott
makes explicit his assumption that this was Red Owl's principal concern:
If a franchisee uses borrowed money as the source of his investment in the franchise, his
poor performance risks only his lender's money, not his own. Red Owl therefore regarded a
substantial equity contribution from its franchisees as the key to a successful
franchise.... Although the amount of unencumbered cash Hoffman was supposed to supply
was never precisely identified by Red Owl officials, they reasonably would have assumed
that by stating he could contribute $i8,ooo, Hoffman meant that he could and would supply
his own cash in setting up the business and would not rely on money lent by others.
Scorr & KRAUS, supra note 6, at 294-95 (4th ed. 2oo7).
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capital." The first financial plan even considered profit on sale of the
Chilton lot as equity capital, though clearly it was effectively a loan from
the builder, to be guaranteed by Red Owl.24' And there was no
suggestion at the time, or later at trial, that the officials who drafted that
plan had expected Hoffmann to have $18,ooo in cash available for
investment. Though not in the first plan, all subsequent proposed
financial plans considered Hoffmann's unencumbered bakery equipment
to be "equity capital." The third financial plan, which was drafted by high
corporate officials from Minneapolis, did not designate the father-in-
law's $13,000 contribution as "equity capital," even though when they
presented this plan to Hoffmann they also presented a form for the
father-in-law to sign designating the money as a gift. Moreover, if the
bakery equipment and the father-in-law's contribution had both been
considered equity capital in the final plan, then there would have been a
substantial increase in the amount of equity required over the course of
the negotiations.
Moreover, the standard analysis for why an investment of equity is
required assumes that the investor can walk away from the debt by
declaring bankruptcy or organizing the enterprise so that the debt is
owed by a limited liability entity." In Hoffmann's case, this was not a
practical alternative. He was or would be personally liable on all debt
contemplated over the course of the negotiations. 43 As Lukowitz surely
knew, Hoffmann is not the type of person who would have declared
bankruptcy, especially in the early 196os when individual bankruptcy was
quite uncommon in the United States.2" He was a young man seeking a
career in business, had established a good business reputation in
Wautoma, and would have been most reluctant to compromise that
reputation by defaulting on a loan from the bank. And certainly he
would continue to feel obligated to repay his father-in-law whether or
241. See supra note 8o and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 240. Scott assumes the franchisee using borrowed funds "risks only his lender's
money, not his own." ScoTT & KRAUS, supra note 6. The text indicates ways in which a franchisee might
avoid personal liability to his lender as well as to other creditors.
243. And none of the prospective creditors would have had a secured claim to any of the assets of
the Red Owl store if Red Owl took over the business, except for the bakery equipment. Hoffmann
says today that it never became clear whether Hoffmann would keep his bakery equipment if Red Owl
took over the store. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 102.
244. Bankruptcy filing rates were very low by contemporary standards throughout the 196os. Total
filings were between ioo,ooo and 200,000 cases annually. See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 25 tbl.3-1 (1971). Wisconsin's per capita bankruptcy filing
rate was average for the country. See id. at 28-29 tbl-3-2. By way of comparison, total national
bankruptcy filings surpassed one million in the mid-199os. See NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs 77 (1997). The great growth in bankruptcy filing rates occurred
after enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See CHARLES JORDAN TAaB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY 39 (i997) (referring to "the exponential growth in the number of bankruptcy cases since
the enactment of the 1978 Act").
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not he declared bankruptcy. As applied to Hoffmann, a distinction
between equity capital and borrowed funds made little difference in
structuring his incentives to run the Red Owl store efficiently.
There is another possible account of Red Owl's motives, one
suggested by Hoffmann's recounting to us of the warning that he
received from Lukowitz about Red Owl's emerging financial difficulties.
Despite the passage of more than forty-five years, Hoffmann remembers
this conversation with clarity.245 Much of Lukowitz's and Red Owl's
behavior is consistent with an assumption that Red Owl's Franchise
Department changed its policy in late October so that it was inclined to
invest less in small-town franchises and take less risk. According to
Hoffmann, the tone of his meeting with Red Owl officials in Chilton in
late September was very supportive,246 whereas the tone at the meeting in
Minneapolis in late November was very different and Red Owl officials
began suggesting that Hoffmann would need to raise more money. Their
concern was clearly that Hoffmann needed to obtain additional total
funds, whether borrowed or unborrowed, without any focus at this time
on equity capital as such.247 Further, in early November, Lukowitz began
looking for used fixtures for the Chilton store, which reduced Red Owl's
potential investment through its loan to finance the fixtures. Finally, Red
Owl's increasing demands that Hoffmann have additional funds
(including borrowed funds) for promotion, to ride out an early period of
unprofitability as he was getting established in Chilton, would also have
reduced the risk to Red Owl. Red Owl, after all, would have been
Hoffmann's largest creditor-on the fixtures loan, on trade credit, and as
guarantor on Hoffmann's rent agreement with the contractor -and it did
not want Hoffmann to be unable to meet his current obligations."
There is nothing about Lukowitz's warning in the transcript, nor
any discussion of Red Owl's financial condition or policies respecting
investment in small-town franchises.249 We have consulted Red Owl's
245. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
247. Red Owl's $26,ooo plan, offered in December, asked for an additional $2000 in borrowed
funds for promotional expenses. The final plan increased that amount by an additional $8ooo for the
same purpose.
248. The testimony of Walter Hall, credit manager for Red Owl, supports this interpretation. See
Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 327 ("I was protecting the investment of Red Owl.. . .").
Especially on cross-examination, he was asked why it was important that there be a contribution of
equity. See id. He responded by citing the concern that Hoffmann might have cash flow problems in
the early period of the franchise, and that requiring equity reduced the need to make payments for
debt during this period. Id. at 327-28. He acknowledged that Red Owl would be an important creditor
and that one reason to insist that the father-in-law agree to the $13,ooo gift was to protect Red Owl's
investment. Id. at 327-30.
249. Van Hoof's one effort to ask about these matters was barred by an objection that the trial
judge sustained. See supra note sol.
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annual reports for the relevant period. 50 Those reports indicate that
franchises constituted a relatively small part of the overall Red Owl
business, accounting for about twenty percent of gross sales and
earnings."' The major part of the business was company-owned stores,
which were located in larger towns (like Appleton, where the final
meeting with Hoffmann occurred). During the period under
consideration, Red Owl was focused on expansion of its company stores
into larger markets."' In 1961, this effort included a major effort,
financed by internally generated funds, to expand into the Chicago and
Denver markets.253 Perhaps those investments required the rest of the
company to restrict its investments in other ventures.
In the end, it is impossible to know for sure what motivated Red
Owl. What may have happened is that there was some kind of policy
change in the Franchise Department, and this may have prompted the
increasing demands that Hoffmann invest more in the business.
Headquarters officials may or may not have known what Lukowitz had
told Hoffmann. Red Owl officials may have felt that they were within
their rights when they increased their asking price for a franchise. Or
they may have known about Lukowitz's assurances but assumed that
they faced no real threat of a lawsuit by Hoffmann because of cost
barriers to litigation.
In this context, it may be useful to speculate about Red Owl's
litigation strategy. At some point early in the litigation, and certainly
after they had deposed Hoffmann, it must have become clear to Red Owl
that Hoffmann's case relied on statements made to him by Lukowitz. Yet
250. Red Owl's annual reports for 1954 to 1971 are in the library of the Minnesota Historical
Society. In 1967, Red Owl was acquired by Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. See Bertin C. Gamble: An Inventory
of His Papers at the Minnesota Historical Society, http://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/oo479.xml
(last visited Mar. 17, 2ojo). Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. was later merged into Wickes, Inc., which filed for
bankruptcy in 1982. See Wickes Inc.-Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Wickes-Inc-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
251. RED OWL STORES, INC., 1962 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter 1962 ANNUAL REPORT]. The
franchises constituted what was called the "Agency Division," headed by Frank Walker during the
relevant period. The annual reports say little about this agency division, though they do contain an
accounting for the division showing that sales to agency stores grew modestly during the relevant
period. The 1962 Report stated: "Further expansion of the Agency Division . . . for the most part
utilizes existing facilities." Id. at 7. It is not clear whether this statement suggests a deemphasis on
creating new franchises, but it might.
252. LOEWI & Co., A STUDY OF RED OWL STORES, INC. I (1958) ("[T]he current stepped-up program
of opening larger supermarkets in metropolitan centers and closing smaller rural stores was
started ... .The vigorous continuation of this expansion program now underway gives promise of
further significant earnings growth in the years ahead.").
253. RED OWL STORES, INC., 1961 ANNUAL REPORT 3. Red Owl sold off its Chicago stores in 1963
and its Denver stores in 1966, in both cases after suffering losses. RED OWL STORES, INc., 1964 ANNUAL
REPORT 3; RED OWL STORES, iNC., 1967 ANNUAL REPORT 3. In 1961 and '962, Red Owl was also
preparing to purchase Snyder Drugs, perhaps creating an additional drain on capital. See 1962
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25i, at 3.
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at no time in the trial did Red Owl try to distance themselves from
Lukowitz by suggesting that it was not reasonable for Hoffmann to rely
on Lukowitz as their agent. 54 Rather, Red Owl's trial strategy was to
suggest that Lukowitz had not made any representations that were not
fulfilled, going to some length to stress that nobody in Red Owl ever
found fault with Lukowitz's interactions with Hoffmann.255 But the jury
apparently did not believe Lukowitz's claims that he had only offered
opinions and advice."' Hoffmann wanted more than that before he
would act, and Lukowitz created the impression that he had cleared
everything with the home office.
We can also ask why Red Owl chose to litigate this case so
vigorously. The damages claimed were not great,' and the ultimate
settlement was for a modest amount. Simply from the perspective of
saving litigation costs, an earlier settlement offer would seem to have
been in Red Owl's best interests. We have no doubt that Red Owl
believed strongly that the law favored them, but does a corporation like
Red Owl litigate just to vindicate a legal position? One possible
explanation for Red Owl's aggressive litigation perspective comes from
Hoffmann's current recollection that there were other prospective
franchisees in the same area of Wisconsin who were caught up in the
policy change that required greater franchisee investment and whose
deals consequently did not go through.25' If this recollection is correct,
perhaps Red Owl feared that if Hoffmann got a settlement, other
254. Hoffmann's brief on appeal emphasized this point. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
Scott points out that the key statement by Lukowitz-that the sale of the bakery was the only thing
holding up the deal-was made after Hoffmann's meeting in Chilton with Carlson and Hall. See Scott,
supra note 14, at 95. "By that time, Hoffman knew well that their approval, and not Lukowitz's was
the key to securing the franchise." Id. But this ignores the fact that Red Owl always communicated
with Hoffmann through Lukowitz. Hoffmann's understanding when he sold the bakery was that
Lukowitz had checked with Minneapolis headquarters, and officials there had said that the sale of the
bakery was the only thing holding up the deal.
255. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 324 (testimony of Walter Hall).
256. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
257. Red Owl was a Delaware corporation and hence there was a diversity of citizenship with
Hoffmann. See LOEWI & Co., supra note 252. The jurisdictional amount at the time was $io,ooo, see 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958), and the complaint was for $3o,ooo. Hoffmann sued both Red Owl and
Lukowitz, however, and Lukowitz lived and worked in Green Bay. To have removed the case to
federal court, Red Owl would have had to get the case against Lukowitz dismissed, which they could
have done if they had been willing to admit at the very beginning that all of Lukowitz's actions were
within his delegated authority. See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, 202-
03 (3d ed. 2001) ("If both the existence and the identity of the agent's principal are fully disclosed to
the other party, the agent does not become a party to any contract which he negotiates."). If the case
had been removed to federal court, the trial would have been in Milwaukee rather than Appleton,
which was essentially Hoffmann's home town and where he was working at the time of the trial. And it
would have made matters quite a bit more inconvenient for Hoffmann's lawyer, Mr. Van Hoof, whose
offices were in Little Chute, a small town near Appleton.
258. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
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lawsuits would surely be forthcoming. We do not know whether other
lawsuits were ever filed.
VI. WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED
A. ABOUT LITIGATION, FACT FINDING, AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Storytelling reveals that the facts stated in an appellate opinion are
incomplete. In the case of Hoffnan, the omitted facts tend to recast key
issues in importantly different ways.
First, our story suggests that the key reliance by the Hoffmanns was
the sale of the bakery building and business. This was their livelihood.
The sale ultimately became a career-changing event. And it was precisely
at this point that the Hoffmanns hesitated, insisted on extra assurances
that the deal would go through, and received them from Lukowitz. After
Hoffmann had met with officials from Red Owl headquarters in Chilton,
had given them a fully accurate statement of his financial affairs, and
received Red Owl's first financial plan, Lukowitz telephoned Hoffmann
and told him "that Minneapolis had told him (Lukowitz) that the only
hitch in this thing at the present time was that I had to get rid of my
bakery and my bakery building."' Hoffmann relied on this statement to
his detriment. It is very unlikely he would have sold his bakery absent
Lukowitz's reassurances.
The supreme court's opinion does not reveal that there was
anything special about this moment. It considers the key Red Owl
assurance to be Lukowitz's statement in June, at the time of the sale of
the Wautoma grocery, that $18,ooo would be enough to set up Hoffmann
in a Red Owl store. Lukowitz made such a statement, and without it
Hoffmann might not have sold the Wautoma grocery. But Hoffmann had
much less reason to understand that this assurance effectively promised
him a franchise, as compared with Lukowitz's later statement that the
sale of the bakery was "the only hitch." In June, a site for Hoffmann's
franchise had not yet been selected, Red Owl had made no inquiry into
Hoffmann's finances, and Hoffmann had no idea what headquarters
officials knew or had told Lukowitz at that time. Further, the Wautoma
grocery was a business that Hoffmann had purchased in order to gain
experience in managing a grocery store and to demonstrate to Red Owl
his managerial abilities in that field. It was not his livelihood, and he did
not expect to own it for more than a short period. Moreover, by the time
of the sale of the bakery, whatever assurance had been made about
$18,ooo being the outside limit of Hoffmann's investment was clearly no
longer operative. By this time, Red Owl had accepted Hoffmann's
proposal to invest his bakery equipment in addition to the $i8,ooo,
259. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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something that later financial plans considered as part of his equity
contribution. Further, it was clear to Hoffmann that Red Owl anticipated
investment of the proceeds of the sale of the bakery building, which
would push Hoffmann's cash investment to over $i8,ooo210
What might account for this difference between the court's view and
our view about what are the important facts? Certainly litigation
strategies played a role. Although the court noted the sale of the bakery
building, it did not even mention the sale of the bakery business.
Evidence about the sale of the business had been excluded by the trial
court because the business was owned by a corporation, albeit one
wholly owned by the Hoffmanns. The trial court also did not allow
Hoffmann to amend the complaint to include the corporation as a party.
Rather than appeal either ruling, Hoffmann's lawyer chose to file a
second complaint on behalf of the corporation. That action was stayed
during the appeal and then combined with the principal action on
remand from the supreme court for ascertainment of damages.
In 1965, Wisconsin required an appellant in the supreme court to
include an Appendix to its brief that included an extensive narrative
summary of the transcript.' This narrative summary in Hoffman
reported relatively little about assurances to Hoffmann at the time of the
sale of the bakery and placed much greater emphasis on assurances at
various times that $18,ooo would be enough investment by Hoffmann.
The statement of facts in the parties' briefs also mentions little about the
assurances to the Hoffmanns at the time of the sale of the bakery.262 It is
likely that the court, in educating itself about the facts of the case, paid
much closer attention to the parties' statement of facts in the Appendices
than to the trial transcript. The parties' decision to cast the facts in this
way may have reflected the focus in the appeal on the jury's findings of
extensive damages on the sale of the Wautoma grocery.263 In his cross-
appeal, Hoffmann sought to reinstate that jury verdict.
The failure of the court to mention the extra assurances provided to
Hoffmann before the sale of the bakery building may have another
260. See supra notes 82-87, 114-15 and accompanying text.
261. Wis. STAT. § 251.34(5)(c) (1965) ("The appendix shall contain... [a]n abridgment of the
appeal record, including the transcript, but only so much thereof as is necessary and material to a
consideration of the questions involved. The abridgement of the testimony shall be in narrative form
with marginal page references to the record."). The narrative summary was in addition to the actual
transcript, which was included in the record on appeal. The briefs of both parties cited both the
narrative summary from the Appendix and the trial record. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 12;
Respondents' Brief, supra note 21.
262. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at 15 (one sentence devoted to assurances at this time);
Respondents' Brief, supra note 211, at 5 (two sentences).
263. Scott observes that the full trial transcript "paints a very different picture" than does the




explanation. Red Owl argued strenuously in its appellate brief that the
supreme court should direct a verdict on the issue of losses from sale of
the Wautoma grocery because there was no evidence of any promise by
Red Owl at that time, a position the court did not accept or even discuss
with specificity. Emphasis in the opinion on the discussions between
Lukowitz and Hoffmann, at the time of the sale of the bakery, would
have called attention to how much weaker was the evidence of an
actionable assurance at the time of the sale of the Wautoma grocery.
It is hard to establish "the facts" involved in a complex transaction
that occurred over forty years ago. As we move from the appellate
opinion to the edited transcript that was before the court, we get both
more answers and more questions. When we look at the full transcript
and interview one of the parties, we learn more but we still must create a
story that makes sense. There still are gaps and conflicting points of view.
Anyone trying to tell the story necessarily must select what she chooses
to report and give emphasis to what she sees as important.
We and Professor Scott tell somewhat different stories about
Hoffman v. Red Owl. Scott focuses on explaining Red Owl's behavior.
He says that the key to understanding the case is to "put to one side a
consideration of the various actions taken by Hoffmann in reliance on
statements made by Lukowitz" and to focus on "[w]hat explains the
behavior of Red Owl officials who, according to the court, repeatedly
increased Hoffman's minimum capital requirements."' 64 This leads Scott
to emphasize Red Owl's stated concern that Hoffmann should have
sufficient equity capital to invest.265 In describing the reasons why
Hoffmann broke off negotiations after Red Owl's third financial plan,
Scott accepts the explanation given by Red Owl's vice president, Walker:
that Hoffmann's father-in-law would not let him incur further debt.'6 He
does not mention Hoffmann's explanation-he testified that he did not
want to ask his father-in-law to make his financial contribution a gift.i
We choose not to ignore Ed Lukowitz's statements to Joe
Hoffmann, especially those made preceding the sale of the bakery
264. Id. at 75.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 84.
267. Professor Scott also speculates that the primary problem was Hoffmann's "personal
relationship with his father-in-law, who appears to have been a prosperous, but stern,
Calvinist.... [H]is father-in-law was sufficiently skeptical about Joe's business acumen that he wanted
to have some control over his money." Id. at 84-85. In making these comments, Scott makes
assumptions about the father-in-law and his relationship with Hoffmann that are not supported by the
transcript. There is nothing in the transcript about either topic. Hoffmann's contemporary
recollections are quite different from Scott's assumptions. Hoffmann remembers his father-in-law, a
farmer himself, as being supportive and proud of his son-in-law's business successes. Hoffmann says
today that his father-in-law would have signed the agreement that the $53,000 be a gift if he had been
asked, but Joe did not think it was right. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 97.
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business. Scott discounts statements made by Lukowitz after the Chilton
meeting with officials from Red Owl's headquarters, because Hoffmann
surely knew afterward that Lukowitz was not the ultimate
decisionmaker.26 8 We believe that Hoffmann knew that Lukowitz was not
the ultimate decisionmaker well before that. But we also think that
Hoffmann very reasonably understood that Lukowitz was authorized by
Red Owl to convey decisions made at headquarters. In fact, Red Owl
never disputed Lukowitz's agency in this regard.t6 If a jury believed
Hoffmann's testimony that Lukowitz said that the people at the home
office had told him that the "only hitch" to Joe being granted a franchise
was the sale of the bakery, we think the jury could reasonably find the
statement to be a promise. This understanding is entirely consistent with
the encouraging attitude of the Red Owl officials at the Chilton meeting.
It is possible that Lukowitz overstated what he had been told by the
home office officials. There is some reason to believe that some officials
at the home office had not yet considered the adequacy of Hoffmann's
proposed investment in the new franchise. 270 But Lukowitz failed to
convey this information, if he knew it. Moreover, Lukowitz knew he was
persuading Joe Hoffmann to do something that Hoffmann did not want
to do. Had Lukowitz only made carefully limited statements about what
might influence the home office decision, Red Owl would have been
justified in deciding to deny Hoffmann a franchise for good, bad, or no
reason. But Hoffmann testified, credibly, that Lukowitz did make highly
encouraging statements about Red Owl's commitments, which prompted
significant reliance.
We have drawn our own conclusions about what happened. We
have had several extended telephone conversations with Joe Hoffmann,
and we like him. Time has passed, and we have been unable to interview
the other people involved in the events that provoked the litigation or
the lawyers who represented each side. We have tried to be careful. We
have validated most aspects of Hoffmann's story with the trial transcript.
Perhaps we have looked at the transcript with an eye to telling
Hoffmann's story. Certainly, we have focused on what Hoffmann was
told and reasonably believed before he took various fateful steps during
the negotiations. We also doubt that Red Owl officials at the home office
were particularly concerned about how much unencumbered capital
Hoffmann had available because of their shifting view of what they
regarded as his "equity." 7 ' We suspect that Red Owl officials primarily
268. Scott, supra note 14, at 95.
269. See supra notes 237-38, 254-55 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
271. For example, the first financial plan considered the profit on the sale of the lot as "equity."
And the last plan did not consider the father-in-law's $13,000 to be equity, even as Red Owl asked Joe
to obtain his father-in-law's agreement that it be a gift. See supra p. 825 tbl.3.
March 2o1o] 849
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
were concerned that Hoffmann have enough money to ride out a slow
period at the beginning of a new store."' Finally, it is clear that Red
Owl's demands about the resources available to Hoffmann, both
encumbered and unencumbered, increased substantially.
Although all stories about events in the past necessarily reflect a
point of view, we do not regard historical research as so subjective as to
be limited in value. We agree with Scott on many points. Everybody
agrees that Ed Lukowitz spoke with Joe Hoffmann before he sold the
bakery. The transcript shows that a jury could have found that Hoffmann
was told that the "only hitch" holding up award of a franchise was selling
the bakery, and that Hoffmann relied on this statement. We may never
be able to establish conclusively everything that happened in several
small Wisconsin towns in the mid-196os. Nonetheless, good research can
help us get closer to a truthful understanding of what we need to know to
debate intelligently whether Hoffnan v. Red Owl Stores presented a
reasonable circumstance for liability for precontractual reliance.
B. ABOUT THE FAIRNESS OF THE RESULT
Professor Scott characterizes the holding in Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores as an "outlier.""' His characterization surely rests on his judgment
that no promise was made to Hoffmann on which he could have relied
reasonably. 74 Viewed that way, the case could stand as a precedent for
recovery of precontractual reliance in all cases in which the defendant
has not obtained an explicit agreement that each party will absorb any
precontractual reliance losses if the prospective deal were to fall through.
We think that this position would surprise most businesspeople who
assume that you can walk away until you make a contract-unless,
perhaps, you have asked for significant reliance as the one condition for
going ahead with the deal.
Professor Scott is not alone in his skepticism about the Hoffman
opinion. In our own casebook we have a note in which we quote
extensively from the summary transcript in the Appendix to Appellant's
272. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
273. Scott, supra note 14, at 73.
274. Scott's view of the Hoffnan facts is nicely illustrated by his citation of a recent Seventh
Circuit decision as refusing to allow recovery "under similar facts," which validates his conclusion that
Hoffman is an "outlier." See id. at 73 0.9. In the case cited, Beer Capitol Distributing, Inc. v. Guinness
Bass Import Co., 290 F.3d 877, 88o-8x (7th Cir. 2002), the defendant's employee had represented that
he would recommend that the plaintiff be appointed the defendant's exclusive distributor for
southeastern Wisconsin, and the employee did so recommend. On summary judgment, the trial court
found that no agent of the defendant had made any other promise respecting plaintiffs receipt of the
exclusive distributorship. Id. Therefore, plaintiff could not recover for precontractual reliance because
there was no promise that had been breached. Id. The case stands for the inability to recover for
precontractual reliance where the defendant has not breached any promise or representation to the
plaintiff. Evidently, this is how Scott views the Hoffrnan facts.
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Brief.' We then ask whether there was any promise made by Ed
Lukowitz or only opinions and encouragement."' After reading the
complete transcript and talking to Joe Hoffmann, we now view the
situation differently. We think that the jury could reasonably have
viewed Lukowitz's statements preceding the sale of the bakery as a
promise on which Hoffmann reasonably relied to his substantial
detriment. There are two particular issues that we must address to
defend our judgment.
The first issue is whether Lukowitz's statements to the Hoffmanns
in October should have bound Red Owl. The Hoffmanns knew, probably
from the very beginning of the relationship, that Lukowitz was not
authorized to commit Red Owl to granting a franchise. Lukowitz's
superiors at Red Owl headquarters had to approve. But the Hoffmanns
were reasonable in viewing Lukowitz as an agent authorized to
communicate messages from those headquarters officials. Red Owl never
really challenged this position at trial, probably because there was no
reasonable basis for doing so. Lukowitz was a divisional manager in
charge of over eighty stores in Wisconsin and upper Michigan."' He was
responsible for developing proposals for new franchises. And except for
direct meetings with Hoffmann, all communications from Red Owl
headquarters officials had been conveyed to Hoffmann through
Lukowitz.28
The second and more difficult issue is what kind of a promise is
needed before the promisor becomes liable for some or all of the
precontractual reliance losses of the promisee. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin raised this issue in the Hoffman case. It held that there had
been no promise sufficient to make a contract because too many
important details were never agreed upon, but that the promissory
estoppel principle did not require a promise "so comprehensive in
scope."279 The court never specifically addressed, however, what precisely
are the characteristics that distinguish a promise sufficient to invoke
promissory estoppel from mere advice, prediction, or enthusiastic
expression of an opinion.
The opinion does refer to Lukowitz's statements that $18,ooo
"would establish Hoffman in a store" as "Promises,"'2 and most previous
275. I MACAULAY, KIDWELL & WirrFORD, supra note 6, at 398-401.
276. Id. Others have expressed similar reservations about the opinion in Hoffnan. See, e.g.,
Gregory M. Duhl, Red Owl's Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 312-13 (2003); Peter Linzer, Rough
Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 20oo Wis. L. REV. 695,718-19.
277. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 172.
278. One exception to this pattern occurred after the November meeting at the Red Owl
headquarters near Minneapolis. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. This exception occurred
after all of Hoffmann's critical reliances on Lukowitz's assurances.
279. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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interpretations of the case have assumed that was the promise the court
meant to enforce. 8' We have indicated our doubts that Lukowitz's
statements to Hoffmann in June, at the time of the sale of the Wautoma
grocery, should be considered as anything other than advice or
encouragement. We suspect that Hoffmann himself viewed those
statements as such. To impose liability based on those statements does
raise serious questions about whether the requirement of a promise
imposes any limits on liability for precontractual reliance.
But the statements made to Hoffmann in October, when he agreed
to sell the bakery and building, seem to us much different. By that time,
Hoffmann had met with Red Owl headquarters officials who appeared to
approve the proposed location in Chilton. Those officials had reviewed
Hoffmann's personal financial statement and then drafted a proposed
financial plan for the franchise. And Hoffmann was being asked to sell
the bakery and building so that he could invest more in the franchise
than he had originally planned. In those circumstances, Lukowitz's
statement that the sale of the bakery was "the last hitch" could be
understood by an ordinary person as a commitment.tS Hoffmann says
today that he understood it as a commitment.283
We do not mean to suggest that the only possible understanding of
the discussions between Lukowitz and Hoffmann was that Red Owl was
making a promise. This is not a case where Hoffmann was entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of liability. Hoffmann knew that
ultimately he needed a document signed by one or more officials from
the home office. Not everything had been decided about the terms of
Hoffmann's franchise,"' though more had been decided than many
people assume.55 Unless, however, a promise sufficient to invoke
promissory estoppel must be definite enough to complete a contract-in
which case there would be no law of precontractual liability-we think
the October discussions sufficed to justify a jury verdict in Hoffmann's
favor. Hoffmann asked for assurances before he took what was obviously
a big step for him, and Lukowitz, purporting to speak for Red Owl as an
281. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 17, at 196-97.
282. We have earlier noted that the trial judge's charge instructed the jury to interpret the
communications as they would be understood by somebody in Hoffmann's life situation. See supra
note 192 and accompanying text.
283. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hoffmann, supra note 2o. ("When he [Lukowitz] urged me
to sell the bakery, I thought he was representing that we had a deal.").
284. From Red Owl's perspective, not even the location of the franchise had been finalized, though
Hoffmann may have thought otherwise. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
285. Red Owl had a standard form contract that dictated many terms, including the terms of the
fixtures loan and the trade credit that Hoffmann would receive on the purchase of groceries (seven
days' credit). Transcript of Trial, supra note 9, at 66-67. There was a draft floor plan, and the
contractor who would build the store had been selected. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
There was a formula by which the rent that Hoffmann would pay on the store would be determined.
See supra note 8o and accompanying text.
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authorized agent, delivered them. Lukowitz's statement was understood
to mean that Red Owl would be happy with a franchise run by Joe
Hoffmann with the capitalization that Hoffmann had then offered to
provide."'
If we are right that there was an actionable promise made to
Hoffmann when he sold the bakery, was it breached? This turns on what
the promise means. This is a difficult question in all precontractual
reliance cases. A complete contract has not yet been negotiated, and we
think that some reasons would justify a party who has made such a
promise to back out without liability. What promise did Lukowitz convey
to Hoffmann? We think that the promise meant that Red Owl would not
back out because it changed its mind about anything it knew when
Lukowitz told Hoffmann that the sale of the bakery was the only hitch."
And as we have stressed, after Hoffmann sold the bakery, Red Owl
increased its demands concerning the amount of the Hoffmanns'
investment.
If the actionable promise was the "only hitch" statement that
prompted the sale of the bakery, what does this suggest about the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision? The opinion affirmed all of the
damages awarded by the trial court and remanded for a further trial on
286. Professor Jay Feinman sees the decision in Hoffman v. Red Owl as "'problematic." See Jay M.
Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORMAM L. REV. 303, 315 (1992). He says:
Hoffnan can hardly be understood on the basis of promissory estoppel doctrine.... [I]t
may be better understood as a tort case involving negligent misrepresentation of a peculiar
kind. It can be best understood, though, as a relational case. The relational analysis would
proceed at two levels; it would examine the interactions between the parties, which
extended over several years, involved many different issues, and were conducted by several
agents of Red Owl, and would then look at the broader setting in which franchisors and
their agents employ a variety of techniques to procure franchisees. That kind of analysis, not
constrained by notions of promise or reliance, would provide a better understanding of how
courts treat such cases and how they should do so. It might well provide a contested
understanding; we could argue about the appropriate scope of liability of franchisors for the
acts of their agents in particular settings, but at least the argument would proceed from a
fuller understanding of the case, and one that is more attuned to the responsibilities that
arise from relationships.
Id. (footnote omitted). We find much to like about the suggested relational approach in setting the
liabilities between franchisors and prospective franchisees. However, we think that when you look at
the facts in the context of this case, on quite conventional grounds the jury and the appellate court
would have been justified in finding a promise to grant a franchise if Joe Hoffmann would sell the
bakery. Consideration of the relational background of the case would further support that conclusion,
by justifying interpretation of Lukowitz's statements in the way Hoffmann says he understood them.
287. This is consistent with the view about the meaning of the promise in precontractual reliance
cases suggested years ago by Charles Knapp in a famous article. It is what he called a "contract to
bargain." See Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 684-86
(1969).
288. See supra notes Is8, 146 and accompanying text. we have also made clear earlier that there
was no issue of Hoffmann not having available any of the resources that he claimed to have at the time
he sold the bakery. See supra note 63.
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damages related to the Wautoma grocery."' If we are right that
Lukowitz's statement in June-that $18,ooo was enough to get Hoffmann
a franchise-was not enough to justify liability, the supreme court should
have directed a verdict on damages in connection with the sale of the
Wautoma grocery." If the court had done this and distinguished events
in June from those in October, there would have been less debate about
the Hoffman case over the years.
In terms of the fairness of the ultimate result in the case, however,
any error by the court in not directing a verdict on the claim for damages
for sale of the Wautoma grocery may have been harmless. We have
speculated, reasonably, we think, that the ultimate settlement was driven
by damages for sale of the bakery business. 9' We doubt that on remand
Hoffmann was able to demonstrate damage arising from the sale of the
Wautoma grocery, which was sold for approximately the same amount
that Hoffmann had paid for it. There may also have been what Peter
Linzer has called "rough justice."' 92 Hoffmann used the settlement
proceeds to support his family during the lean years when he was starting
his new career in life insurance sales, a career to which he turned because
he had given up his livelihood as a baker.
C. THE STATUS OF HOFFMAN v. RED OWL STORES AS A PRECEDENT
It is common to interpret a precedent as though the facts of the case
are those stated in the opinion. From that perspective, Hoffman stands
for enforcement of the "promise" that Hoffmann would get a franchise
for an investment of $18,ooo. Scott has referred to Hoffman as an
unfortunate case that, because of the attention that it has received, has
retarded thinking about the precise limits of a rule allowing recovery for
precontractual reliance.293 We agree that because the court does not
explain why Lukowitz's statements about the $i8,ooo should be
considered a promise rather than a mere opinion or enthusiastic
289. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275, 277 (Wis. 1965).
290. It could also be argued that the Court should have reversed the award to Hoffmann of $iooo
for the option on the Chilton lot. At the time Hoffmann committed that money, he did ask for
assurance from Lukowitz that it was an appropriate expenditure. Lukowitz knew that Hoffmann was
careful with his money and did not want to expend the money unless the franchise was going to be
placed in Chilton. Lukowitz purported to (and perhaps did) check with Red Owl headquarters before
telling Hoffmann to go ahead. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. On the other hand, at that
time Hoffmann had not met with any Red Owl headquarters officials and they had not drafted a first
financial plan detailing his investment. In sum, there were some characteristics of an actionable
promise at this time, but not as many as there were later at the time of the sale of the bakery.
293. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. These damages had been excluded from the first
trial and were estimated by Hoffmann's lawyer to be $6ooo. See supra note 185 and accompanying
text.
292. See Linzer, supra note 276, at 695 n.
293. See Scott, supra note 34, at 73 72.
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encouragement, the opinion does not help explain the limits on
precontractual reliance.
In historical context, however, the Hoffman case is best known as
the leading early American case to allow recovery for precontractual
reliance, in a situation where the parties clearly contemplated at all
relevant times later negotiations and agreement.29 4 Though still
controversial, a considerable majority of commentators now support a
legal remedy for precontractual reliance in some circumstances." It is
now widely recognized that when, in precontractual bargaining, only one
party detrimentally relies, the other party is immediately in a stronger
bargaining position. The relying party now has an investment it wants to
protect, while the other party can walk away from the deal without loss.
For reasons of both efficiency and fairness, scholars who advocate
various positions are now willing to accept, at least in some
circumstances, recovery of reliance loss caused by a failed negotiation.
Most are comfortable with such a recovery where the reliance was at the
defendant's urging or was a foreseeable and desired response to a strong
assurance that a deal would be reached.29 The efficiency concern is that
without some legal protection, the relying party will be reluctant to make
a precontractual investment that will likely benefit the parties'
prospective project. The fairness concern is that because of its stronger
294. T FARNSWORTH, supra note I, § 3.26, at 379 ("In recent decades, courts have begun to . .. base
liability on a specific promise that has been made in order to interest the other party in the
negotiations and that the other party has relied on.... The leading decision in this line is Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores .- . ."). Hoffman is also historically significant for using the doctrine of promissory
estoppel to frame a new doctrine allowing recovery for precontractual reliance in appropriate
circumstances. It did not have to be that way. Others have suggested that a doctrine of good faith be
employed as a vehicle for policing precontractual bargaining behavior and allowing recovery for
precontractual reliance in appropriate cases, as is done in some European countries. See Friedrich
Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A
Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (1964). We suspect that the doctrine would have
developed in either doctrinal frame, but there are potential advantages in debating the issues in the
terms of promissory estoppel. When it comes to establishing the limits on recovery for precontractual
reliance, promissory estoppel tends to focus the debate on whether there was a "promise" and whether
the reliance was a foreseeable consequence of the promise. While these terms are vague and require
interpretation, they point to considerations that surely should help define the limits on this theory of
liability.
295. See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 296.
296. Juliet Kostritsky details this rationale for precontractual liability, citing many other
authorities and discussing several cases upholding this view. See Juliet Kostritsky, Uncertainty,
Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. Rev. 1377, 1410-38 (2oo8).
For similar reasons, Scott and his frequent collaborator, Alan Schwartz, have argued in favor of
recovery of precontractual reliance when there is a "preliminary agreement" that both parties will
invest precontractually and one party later reneges. See Alan Schwartz & Robert F. Scott,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 12o HARv. L. REV. 661, 703-04 (2007). There was
not an agreement for both parties to invest precontractually in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, as Red
Owl never made any investment (beyond its expenses in vetting Hoffmann) in the proposed Chilton




bargaining position, the nonrelying party may be able in later
negotiations to secure an undue share of the joint benefits from the deal.
It also is possible to justify recovery of precontractual reliance on
freedom of contract or autonomy principles. If parties agree explicitly,
before any precontractual reliance occurs, that such losses will or will not
be reimbursed or shared, few would object to respecting their explicit
agreement. However, we think that this is a rare situation. In Hoffnan
there was no such explicit agreement, and so we have a "gap" situation
that is so common in the law of contract interpretation. Some scholars
prefer very predictable and determinative default rules in such
situations -rules that allow courts little discretion in their application
and require parties to enter explicit agreements if they want something
else.297 We would allow courts, and where appropriate juries, to consider
all the facts in context to fashion a rule for the case that approximates the
parties' "tacit" agreement or probable assumptions.298 And from that
perspective, at least a sharing of Hoffmann's losses with respect to his
bakery business seems to us consistent with the parties' reasonable
assumptions. Notice, too, that the very uncertainty of the situation when
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin remanded the case helped provoke a
settlement. As is true in most precontractual reliance situations, the
amount Red Owl paid to Hoffmann was not a huge sum.'" Nonetheless,
it helped the Hoffmanns cope with the way their lives had been upset by
the failed pursuit of a Red Owl franchise.
Ironically, perhaps, with our view of the full facts, in its ultimate
outcome Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores provides a mainstream example of
precontractual liability under any of these rationales. Hoffmann relied on
Red Owl's assurances in order to benefit the franchise project. He sold
the bakery business and the building in order to get his money together
and position himself to work on establishing the Chilton store as soon as
297. See, e.g., Allan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 618 (2003) ("An efficient default rule ... is simple in form, condition on few states
of the world....").
298. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships,
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MoD. L. REV. 44, 45 (2003) ("Often,
however, the paper deal will not reflect the real deal: a writing can be inconsistent with the actual
expectations of the parties."); William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law
Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 931, 947-50 (arguing that a
contextualized inquiry better respects each party's autonomy or freedom of contract); see also Jason
Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation,
85 VA. L. REV. 385, 496-99 (1999) (suggesting that the decision in Hoffman may have been efficient if
a contextualized inquiry shows the reliance to have been "pretrade performance" without the
defendant disclosing doubts that the deal would go through); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and
Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. Ray. 481, 544-550 ('996) (arguing for case-by-case determination of
when recovery of precontractual reliance is "efficient").
299. See Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools' Doors,
'99' Wis. L. REV. 247, 26647-
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possible. He was reluctant to do this because he knew that Red Owl had
not yet signed a formal franchise contract. Yet he trusted Lukowitz's
statement about the position of the home office-sale of the bakery was
"the only hitch." Hoffmann probably did not think about his legal rights
at this point, but he thought that he had a firm commitment from Red
Owl. When the deal fell apart, he told the Red Owl representatives that
he was considering seeing a lawyer. Further, once the Hoffmanns sold
their bakery business, their bargaining position was compromised
because they had only less attractive alternatives if the deal collapsed.
Red Owl responded by demanding ever-increasing investments from
Hoffmann. If he had made these investments, they would have reduced
Red Owl's risks in the joint enterprise.
Put another way, if we accept the facts as we have reported them,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, far from being an outlier,7 is a very
mainstream precontractual reliance case. The Wisconsin courts, in
perhaps an inelegant but historically significant way, got it right.
3oo. A more recent Seventh Circuit case written by Judge Posner that protects precontractual
reliance may be a better vehicle for examining the outer limits of recovery. In Cosgrove v. Bartolotta,
150 F.3d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff, an experienced corporate lawyer who was the
defendant's family friend, agreed to loan defendant start-up capital and provide defendant with legal
services needed to start a new restaurant. Defendant promised to give the lawyer an ownership
interest in the restaurant. Id. at 732. Plaintiff assisted defendant in negotiating the lease of the
restaurant premises and a loan from a bank, and plaintiff advised defendant on the appropriate
corporate structure for the venture. Id. Plaintiff and defendant never worked out the exact terms
under which plaintiff would receive a share in the restaurant. Id. Plaintiff was willing and able to make
the loan, but he never did this. Id. Defendant obtained financing elsewhere and cut plaintiff out of the
deal. Id. The jury found that there was no contract because details respecting the partial ownership
interest remained to be negotiated, but it nevertheless awarded plaintiff the value of the partial
ownership interest ($17,000) on a promissory estoppel theory. Id. at 731-32. The trial judge
overturned this judgment because plaintiff had failed to prove reliance on the promise. Id. at 731.
Judge Posner wrote an opinion reinstating the jury's award. Id. at 734-35. The pledge of a loan
did not cost plaintiff anything so it was not sufficient reliance to support recovery. Id. at 733. Judge
Posner nonetheless found sufficient reliance to support promissory estoppel in the rendering of
professional services by the plaintiff, even if performed during what would otherwise have been leisure
time. Id. at 733-34. Judge Posner also read Kramer v. Alpine Valley Resort, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 293, 294
(Wis. 1982), as interpreting Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores to allow either reliance or expectation
damages. See Cosgrove, 15o F.3d at 734. He affirmed the jury's award of expectation damages
although both the Hoffman and Kramer cases themselves awarded only reliance damages. See id. at
734-35. Judge Posner's opinion tests the limits of precontractual reliance recovery both because it was
not clear that the reliance was very extensive and because he allowed expectation damages. Reliance
damages might have been difficult to calculate-should the lawyer be allowed to bill at his usual
hourly rate when working outside normal hours for a friend?-but they surely were less than the
$117,ooo expectation damages awarded.
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